1982 Spanish general election

Background

The victory of the Union of the Democratic Centre (UCD) in the 1979 general election allowed Prime Minister Adolfo Suárez to form a new cabinet, whose main goal was to develop the "state of autonomies" envisaged in the newly approved Spanish Constitution of 1978. Subsequently, in April 1979, the first democratic local elections since the Second Spanish Republic saw the UCD emerging as the largest party overall, but losing control of the main urban centers to left-wing administrations formed by the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE) and the Communist Party of Spain (PCE).

The economic situation had worsened as a result of the 1979 oil crisis and an increase in oil barrel prices, with inflation remaining steady at 15%, public deficit soaring to 6% of GDP, a sharp increase in unemployment, and the country's current account registering a net deficit of $5 billion by 1980. This period also saw increased terror activity from various groups, such as ETA, ETA(pm), the GRAPO and far-right gangs such as the Triple A or the Spanish Basque Battalion, seeing the California 47 bombing, the July 1979 Madrid bombings, the Ispaster attack or the Zarautz attack, among others. Concurrently, the end of the political consensus of the Transition period saw the opposition PSOE under Felipe González moving away from Marxism and embraced a market economy in a party congress in September 1979, as well as the launch of a tough opposition campaign which saw a motion of no confidence being tabled against the government in May 1980. While arithmetically unsuccessful, the motion's outcome was regarded as a political victory for González as it allowed him to broadcast his programme live while highlighting Suárez's parliamentary isolation, strengthening the PSOE's role as a credible government alternative.

The process for the establishment of the autonomous communities saw the provisional government of Andalusia under Rafael Escuredo request the "fast-track route" for autonomy access which, while allowing for immediate assumption of regional powers, was initially envisaged only for the three "historical nationalities" of Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia. A referendum on the autonomy initiative in February 1980 saw the "Yes" choice reaching the required threshold in all Andalusian provinces but Almería, causing a political deadlock of several months until an inter-party agreement was reached. Such agreement provided for Andalusia to be allowed autonomy access under the "fast-track" route, on the condition that all other regions—except for Navarre, the Canary Islands and the Valencian Community, which followed their own specific procedures—submitted themselves to the "slow-track" procedure; in exchange, all future autonomous communities would be allowed a parliamentary system with all institutions of self-government. The Spanish government's opposition to Andalusia "fast-tracking" to autonomy destroyed the UCD's popularity in the region, the most populous in Spain, never to recover.

Growing divisions within the UCD—a result of the complex amalgamation of forces of very varying ideologies (social democrats, conservatives, liberals and christian democrats) into a party of power—gradually undermined Suárez's standing. Falling approval ratings and political differences plunged the party into an internal decomposition process which could be seen in legislative issues such as divorce; this, coupled with the lost of internal support and a deteriorating relationship with King Juan Carlos I, ultimately led to Suárez tendering his resignation as both prime minister and UCD leader on 29 January 1981. The investiture of his successor, the then second deputy prime minister and economy minister Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo, was disrupted by a coup attempt on 23 February from rogue military elements under Antonio Tejero, Jaime Milans del Bosch and Alfonso Armada, which failed due to a lack of support from the King and the Spanish Armed Forces at large. Calvo-Sotelo was ultimately elected two days later in the second ballot of investiture.

The tenure of Calvo-Sotelo's government was plagued by several events which further undermined the UCD's position: the toxic oil syndrome outbreak of 1981, affecting over 20,000 people and traced to the illegal marketing of contaminated rapeseed oil; the final approval of the divorce law amid criticisms from the Catholic Church and conservative party elements; the split of the newly-formed Democratic Action Party (PAD) under former justice minister Francisco Fernández Ordóñez; and Spain's entry into NATO being met with the staunch opposition of the parliamentary left, headed by González's PSOE. The opposition People's Alliance (AP), under former Francoist minister Manuel Fraga, advocated a union of the centre-right—the "natural majority" strategy—which, following the UCD's surprise defeat in the 1981 Galician regional election, turned into a bid to take over the entire right-of-centre electorate.

The PSOE landslide in the 1982 Andalusian regional election was a fatal blow to the UCD: from that point onwards, it was relegated to third party status in national opinion polls behind both PSOE and AP, leading to the party imploding and Calvo-Sotelo announcing his intention not to seek re-election in July 1982. Former prime minister Suárez announced the creation of a new centrist party, the Democratic and Social Centre (CDS), while deputy Óscar Alzaga formed the christian democrat People's Democratic Party (PDP) to run in an electoral alliance with AP. The mounting splits and defections throughout the summer of 1982 would have deprived the UCD government of a working majority upon the Cortes's reopening following the holiday recess, leading Calvo-Sotelo to dissolve parliament and call a snap election for 28 October 1982. The parliament's dissolution was criticized as it delayed the approval of the autonomy statutes for Madrid, the Balearic Islands, Castile and León, and Extremadura, as well as the 1983 General State Budget.

Overview

Under the 1978 Constitution, the Spanish Cortes Generales were envisaged as an imperfect bicameral system. The Congress of Deputies had greater legislative power than the Senate, having the ability to vote confidence in or withdraw it from a prime minister and to override Senate vetoes by an absolute majority of votes. Nonetheless, the Senate possessed a limited number of functions—such as ratification of international treaties, authorization of collaboration agreements between autonomous communities, enforcement of direct rule, regulation of interterritorial compensation funds, and its role in constitutional amendment and in the appointment of members to the Constitutional Court and the General Council of the Judiciary—which were not subject to the Congress's override.

Electoral system

Voting for each chamber of the Cortes Generales was on the basis of universal suffrage, which comprised all nationals over 18 years of age and in full enjoyment of their political rights.

The Congress of Deputies was entitled to a minimum of 300 and a maximum of 400 seats, with the electoral law setting its size at 350. 348 members were elected in 50 multi-member constituencies—corresponding to the provinces of Spain, with each being allocated an initial minimum of two seats and the remaining 248 being distributed in proportion to their populations, at a rate of approximately one seat per each 144,500 inhabitants or fraction greater than 70,000—using the D'Hondt method and a closed list proportional voting system, with an electoral threshold of three percent of valid votes (which included blank ballots) being applied in each constituency. The two remaining seats were allocated to Ceuta and Melilla as single-member districts and elected using plurality voting. The use of the electoral method resulted in a higher effective threshold based on the district magnitude and the distribution of votes among candidacies.

As a result of the aforementioned allocation, each Congress multi-member constituency was entitled the following seats:

208 seats in the Senate were elected using an open list partial block voting system: in constituencies electing four seats, electors could vote for up to three candidates; in those with two or three seats, for up to two candidates; and for one candidate in single-member districts. Each of the 47 peninsular provinces was allocated four seats, whereas for insular provinces, such as the Balearic and Canary Islands, districts were the islands themselves, with the larger (Mallorca, Gran Canaria and Tenerife) being allocated three seats each, and the smaller (Menorca, Ibiza–Formentera, Fuerteventura, La Gomera, El Hierro, Lanzarote and La Palma) one each. Ceuta and Melilla elected two seats each. Additionally, autonomous communities could appoint at least one senator each and were entitled to one additional senator per each million inhabitants.

The law provided for by-elections to fill seats vacated in the Congress only when the results in a particular constituency were annulled by a final court's decision deriving from the election's legal challenge procedures; instead, any vacancies that occurred after the proclamation of candidates and into the legislative term were to be covered by the successive candidates in the list and, when required, by the designated substitutes. Additionally for the Senate, by-elections were mandated to fill any seat vacated up to two years into the legislative term.

Eligibility

Spanish citizens of age and with the legal capacity to vote could run for election. Causes of ineligibility were imposed on the following officials:

• The holders of a number of positions: the president and members of the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court, the Council of State and the Court of Auditors; the Ombudsman; high-ranking members—undersecretaries, directors-general and similar positions, as well a those who performed functions conferred by decree approved by the Council of Ministers—of the State Administration, the Social Security and other government agencies; government delegates in the autonomous communities, and civil governors and sub-governors; members of electoral commissions; and the chairs of national trade unions, as well as those holding non-elective union positions at the national level;
• Judges and public prosecutors in active service;
• Personnel of the Armed Forces (Army, Navy and Air Force) and law enforcement corps in active service.

Other causes of ineligibility for both chambers were imposed on a number of territorial-level officers in the aforementioned categories—during their tenure of office—in constituencies within the whole or part of their respective area of jurisdiction. Incompatibility provisions extended to the impossibility of simultaneously holding the positions of deputy and senator.

The electoral law allowed for parties and federations registered in the interior ministry, alliances and groupings of electors to present lists of candidates. Parties and federations intending to form an alliance ahead of an election were required to inform the relevant electoral commission within fifteen days of the election call, whereas groupings of electors needed to secure the signature of at least one permille—and, in any case, 500 signatures—of the electorate in the constituencies for which they sought election, disallowing electors from signing for more than one list of candidates.

Election date

The term of each chamber of the Cortes Generales—the Congress and the Senate—expired four years from the date of their previous election, unless they were dissolved earlier. An election was required to be held within from 30 to 60 days after the scheduled date of expiry of parliament. The previous election was held on 1 March 1979, which meant that the chambers' terms would have expired on 1 March 1983. An election was to take place no later than the sixtieth day from the expiry, setting the latest possible date for election day on Saturday, 30 April 1983.

The prime minister had the prerogative to propose the monarch to dissolve both chambers at any given time—either jointly or separately—and call a snap election, provided that no motion of no confidence was in process, no state of emergency was in force and that dissolution did not occur before one year had elapsed since the previous one. Additionally, both chambers were to be dissolved and a new election called if an investiture process failed to elect a prime minister within a two-month period from the first ballot. Barring this exception, there was no constitutional requirement for simultaneous elections to the Congress and the Senate. Still, as of , there has been no precedent of separate elections taking place under the 1978 Constitution.

The Cortes Generales were officially dissolved on 30 August 1982 with the publication of the dissolution decree in the Official State Gazette (BOE), setting election day for 28 October and scheduling for both chambers to reconvene on 18 November. Since election day fell on a Thursday, it was declared a holiday.

Parties and candidates

Below is a list of the main parties and electoral alliances which contested the election:

The possibility of a nationwide alliance between the UCD and AP was discussed, with the support of people from the business and banking world—concerned about a PSOE's victory with an absolute majority, as predicted by opinion polls—but this was rejected by Lavilla, who wished to appeal to the centre of the political spectrum and viewed AP as too right-wing for that purpose. Manuel Fraga was confident in that a "natural majority [a hypothetical union of the Spanish centre-right electorate] will be realized, either from above or from below". The only exception was in the Basque Country, where a UCD–AP alliance was confirmed at the regional level owing to the "exceptional circumstances" existing in the territory. A nationwide alliance between the UCD and the Liberal Democratic Party (PDL) of Antonio Garrigues Walker was initially confirmed—the PDL having itself been founded in July amid the UCD's internal crisis—but it broke down because of "technical differences" in the make up of electoral lists, with the PDL ultimately choosing to not run in the election. Some sectors within the UCD had also tried to ally themselves with Adolfo Suárez's CDS, with little success as a result of the latter's refusal. The UCD's general reluctance against any alliance in which it was not the dominant party was contested internally, as fears of it heading towards a major election rout increased.

The Democratic Action Party (PAD) of former justice minister Francisco Fernández Ordóñez reached an agreement to run under the PSOE banner, while talks for an eventual alliance between Óscar Alzaga's People's Democratic Party (PDP) and AP came to fruition by early September.

Campaign

Party slogans

Events and issues

The Union of the Democratic Centre tried to campaign focusing on the values of the centre against the alleged radicalism of the PSOE and AP, the two of them had begun to polarize the political scene by 1982.

Nonetheless, the UCD campaign was plagued by organizational problems. No proper campaign chief was named, the messages were varied and confusing and the economic waste, despite being the best-funded campaign, was deemed unaffordable given the electoral prospects. No attempt for simplification of the party's message was made; their proposals consisting of dense and long texts to the simpler and more effective slogans of the other parties. Incumbent Prime Minister Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo was mostly left out from the party campaign, and defections to other parties as well as the refusal to form a broad centre-right coalition with AP had left the UCD in a weak position to voters. Landelino Lavilla was also deemed to have poor public performances: in an opinion article published during the campaign on the Cambio 16 magazine it was noted how Lavilla's speeches were unable to incite any euphoria or to make clear any ideas.

Overall, the party campaign was criticised as having been carried out with reluctance and lack of conviction.

The Spanish Socialist Workers' Party centered its campaign on the perceived need for a political change in the Spanish government. Unlike the 1977 and 1979 campaigns, the PSOE resorted to a catch-all party strategy, presenting itself as the "only effective alternative to UCD". It used a single, simple and catchy slogan ("For change"), meant to simplify the party's message as well as to transmit confidence in the new government. Raised fists and singing of The Internationale also disappeared from PSOE's rallies. Instead, seeking to move away from its traditional left-wing stance and to appeal to a broader electorate through a more centrist platform, the party usually ended its rallies with a jingle ("We must change") centering on the message of "change". The PSOE also relied in a strong personalization around the figure of Felipe González, appealing to ethics and messages of hope as drivers of the political change, but also to show an image of party unity in contrast to the UCD's internal infighting of the previous years. The party's final campaign rally on 26 October, held in the University City of Madrid, was estimated to have gathered roughly half a million people.

Among the PSOE election pledges were the creation of 800,000 employments, the nationalization of banks in a critical economic situation and the decrease of retirement age from 69 to 64, as well as to establish the maximum working time at 40-hour week. It also proposed a wide range of social policies: raising taxes to higher incomes, increasing lowest-earning pensions, promotion of public companies, to increase control and monitoring of companies by workers, to expand unemployment insurances and to reduce social inequality through the social security. Regarding NATO, the PSOE was also a staunch advocate of Spain's exit from the organization, though eventually it would defend a 'Yes' vote in the 1986 referendum on NATO membership.

Leading all opinion polls and fresh from its success in the May Andalusian regional election, the PSOE was widely expected to win the election; its victory being so assured that all other parties' efforts were directed towards avoiding a Socialist absolute majority so that it had to govern through coalitions or agreements, rather than in winning the election themselves.

The People's Alliance and the People's Democratic Party ran in a common ticket for this election, in what would be a foreshadowing of the future People's Coalition from 1983 to 1986. The coalition's communication strategy for the campaign revolved around two main ideas: emphasis on Manuel Fraga's leadership and in the coalition as the only viable alternative to the PSOE. The coalition strategy was also meant to present itself as an example of political cooperation, contrasting with UCD's disintegration. All in all, the purpose of the AP–PDP ticket was to turn itself into the main centre-right reference force of Spain. Manuel Fraga was also concerned in moderating his right-wing stance, avoiding themes such as death penalty or constitutional reform.

Among AP's election pledges were a tax reduction consisting in the suppression of the wealth tax, exemption from the income tax (IRPF) for incomes lower than 750,000 yearly pesetas, deduction of any economic amount intended for productive investments and the setting of an upper limit to individual tax burden. It also proposed the political immunity of Administration officials against successive government changes and a partial privatization of the social security system so that only the most basic levels of attendance would be maintained generally, with other benefits depending on what users paid (but providing extensions for the person attending home in each family and to young people unable to find employment after completing their studies). Finally, it advocated for completing the integration of Spain into NATO, ensuring full employment and to guide the cultural policy under christian humanism.

After its success in the 1981 Galician and 1982 Andalusian regional elections, all opinion polls pointed to AP becoming the main Spanish opposition party, but at a great distance from the PSOE.

During the first days of October, preparations for a coup d'etat attempt scheduled for 27 October (on election day's eve) were unveiled and foiled. The plan was to stage a number of violent actions against different personalities, to culminate later with a great explosion in a block of military houses in Madrid. This would be blamed on ETA and the inefficiency in the fight against terrorism as a means to justify a military takeover. The importance of the coup attempt was downplayed by the media in order to avoid raising social unrest, and it hardly affected the election campaign starting on 7 October. PSOE Vice Secretary-General Alfonso Guerra, however, would state that the incorporation of the Army to democracy was to be one of the goals of a future PSOE government.

Opinion polls

Main article: Opinion polling for the 1982 Spanish general election

Results

Congress of Deputies

Senate

Maps

File:1982 Spanish general election map.svg|Election results by constituency (Congress). File:1982 Spanish election - Results.svg|Vote winner strength by constituency (Congress). File:1982 Spanish election - AC results.svg|Vote winner strength by autonomous community (Congress).

Aftermath

Outcome

With a record high turnout of 79.97%, the Spanish political landscape underwent an electoral earthquake. The ruling Union of the Democratic Centre (UCD) was devastated; it lost 157 seats and fell to 11, a 93.5% loss from 1979. In terms of votes, it went from 6.3 million down to 1.4 million, a loss of 4.9 million votes or 77.8% of its 1979 vote, and plunged to 6.8% of the share to the 34.8% it had won in 1979—a loss of 80.5% of its share. Of its 11 seats, 5 were obtained in Galicia, 3 in Castile and León, 2 in the Canary Islands and only 1 in Madrid, winning no seats in all other regions. Incumbent Prime Minister Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo, who stood in second place in the Madrid list, lost his seat—the only time in recent Spanish history that a sitting prime minister seeking re-election as MP was unseated. It was the worst defeat, both in absolute terms and in terms of percentage of seats lost, for a ruling party at the national level in Spain, and one of the worst defeats ever suffered by a governing party in any country at the time, rivaling only with the collapse of Christian Democracy at the 1994 Italian election or the Progressive Conservatives' downfall at the 1993 Canadian election.

The Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE) swept the popular vote in nearly all regions of the country—only AP and PNV wins in Galicia and the Basque Country denied them a clean sweep of the entire national territory. They won a majority of seats in every region but Galicia, La Rioja and the Balearic Islands, and obtained an astounding 60% in Spain's most populous region, Andalusia—a feat never to happen again. In Catalonia it obtained a 23-point lead over the second most-voted party, a result that would only be surpassed by the PSOE's own result in the 2008 election. Andalusia and Catalonia would become from that point onwards as the main strongholds of PSOE support, which was to remain the dominant political force in both regions in each general election until 2011. Overall, the PSOE won 202 seats—its best historical performance and the best performance of any party in a Spanish general election. This gave them an overwhelming majority in the Congress, nearly doubling the seat-count of its immediate competitor. The PSOE was also the only party to win seats in every district, the first of only three times since the Spanish transition to democracy that this has happened—the other two being PP results in the 2000 and 2011 elections.

The People's Alliance–People's Democratic Party (AP–PDP) coalition had a major breakthrough, gaining a substantial portion of UCD previous support, displacing it as the main party to the right-of-centre in Spain and becoming the country's main opposition party. Despite only topping the polls in Galicia, its results elsewhere where still considered impressive for a party that, in the 1979 election, had only obtained 6% of the vote and 9 seats. It obtained 107 seats—despite opinion polls predicting that it would be well-below the 100-seat mark—and climbed up to 5.5 million votes. It did not win any seats, however, in the districts of Ceuta and Melilla, which essentially worked under a FPTP system. The AP-UCD-PDP coalition in the Basque Country won 2 seats, 1 each for Álava and Biscay, being left out from Gipuzkoa. It would also be the only one of three times that AP and its successor, the PP, would win a seat in the district of Girona.

The Communist Party of Spain (PCE) suffered from PSOE's growth, falling from 23 seats to 4—a loss of 82.6%—and losing 1.1 million votes to 850,000 —a loss of 60%. Furthermore, it fell to 4.02% of the share, from 10.8% in 1979. As a result of not reaching the required 5% threshold and 5 seats to obtain a parliamentary group in Congress of its own, the PCE was forced into the Mixed Group, with the fear of becoming an extraparliamentary party at the next election remaining for the entire legislature. On the other hand, nationalist parties such as PNV and CiU benefitted from the UCD's collapse and enlarged their political representation. CiU gained 4 seats for a total of 12, placing among the top two in Catalonia, a first in a general election since 1977.

Government formation

Congress Speaker Gregorio Peces-Barba (PSOE), in an uncommon gesture, did not cast a ballot and maintained strict neutrality, as his party's lopsized majority all but guaranteed González's election. The 202-strong PSOE absolute majority would come to be known as the "roller" (rodillo in Spanish), in reference to the party's overwhelming parliamentary power. Any bill submitted by González' government was assured to be approved by Congress, with the parliamentary process of law-making and approval turning into a mere formality.

Legacy

The October 1982 general election led to a major reconfiguration of the Spanish political scene. While institutionally, the Spanish transition to democracy ended in December 1978 after the approval of the 1978 Constitution in referendum and its subsequent adoption, historically the transition is considered to have ended with the 1982 election. The threat of a military coup d'etat after the failed 23-F coup had effectively ended, after preparations for the 27-O coup attempt were foiled. The election's aftermath ensured a lasting political stability that would favour the implementation of reforms that would definitively settle democracy in Spain. Furthermore, the exceptionally high turnout (80%) was seen as a strong endorsement by the Spanish people on the democratic system, and the political earthquake resulting from the election was deemed as the Spaniards' desire to break up with the past and to look into the future, rallying behind the PSOE and the "for change" premises it had campaigned for.

The UCD, the political party which had led the country into the transition from Francisco Franco's dictatorship into a fledgling democracy, was not only ousted from power, but almost entirely decimated in the election. From the 35% of the share and 168 seats it had obtained in 1979 it was reduced to a mere 7% and 11 seats. It had lost 4.9 million votes in its last three years in power (roughly 80% of its 1979 voter base) and was left as a third party with no ability to influence the government. As a result, the UCD, which had been in office since its inception in 1977 until December 1982, effectively ceased to exist as in February 1983, when its leadership decided to dissolve the party as it was unable to cope with the mounting debts. Its collapse was seen with time as the result of the voters' perception of it not acting with consistency, clarity and effectiveness, and because of the internal party division and infighting that plagued the UCD's final time in power.

The PSOE won the election in a landslide with a large absolute majority of seats and roughly half (48.1%) of the vote share. With 202 out of the 350 seats at stake in the Congress and 134 out of the 208 electable seats in the Senate, it won roughly 60% of the seats in each chamber, a record result not surpassed ever since by any political party. Its 10,127,392-vote result, comprising 38% of the voting-able electorate at the time, was not reached by any party until the 2000 general election held 18 years later, when the PP obtained 10,321,178 (however, as the voting-able electorate was much larger in 2000, that result was not as lopsized in percentage terms as it was in 1982). For the next decade, the Socialists would dominate Spanish politics with no other party having a realistic chance of forming government, leading some commentators to suggest that Spain had moved to a dominant-party system. Eventually, the PSOE would not be seriously challenged until 1993, when they were reduced to a minority government, remaining in power for another 3 years until 1996. To date, Felipe González' 1982–1996 stay in power (four terms comprising 14 years) remains the longest period of continuous government by a democratically elected PM, with governments ever since usually having shorter durations of 8 years (two terms).

The People's Alliance became the major opposition party as a result of this election, having been a minor party in the 1977–1982 period. It replaced the UCD as the main non-socialist party in Spain, and has maintained this position for most of the last four decades. However, despite its position as the main alternative to the PSOE, its perceived right-wing stance, subsequent internal crises and leadership changes, as well as the PSOE's enduring popularity until the early 1990s, ensured the party would remain electorally stagnant throughout the decade. AP would also face the direct competition of Suárez's CDS in the 1986–1989 period, which for some time was even expected to surpass AP as the PSOE's main rival. The party's position would not improve until its relaunch as the People's Party in 1989 and the leadership of José María Aznar, which would eventually led to the establishment in 1993 of a two-party system in Spain, and in the PP's rise to power in 1996.

Notes

References

Bibliography

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45. (21 February 1982). "Fraga afirma que la mayoría natural es una invitación a la solidaridad". El País.
46. Navarro, Beatriz. (8 April 2018). "Fraga pidió "cinco minutos y una foto" con Reagan para presionar a UCD en 1981". La Vanguardia.
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52. (31 July 1982). "Calvo Sotelo reconoce que no será 'cabeza de cartel' en las próximas elecciones". El País.
53. (29 July 1982). "Suárez confirma su abandono de UCD y prepara un nuevo partido". El País.
54. (21 July 1982). "La lista de los dirigentes del partido de Oscar Alzaga causó preocupación en el 'cuartel general' de UCD". El País.
55. Jauregui, Fernando. (11 August 1982). "Preocupación en UCD por la 'mala imagen' que da Calvo Sotelo". El País.
56. (26 August 1982). "Aumentan las posibilidades de disolución de las Cortes y se estudia la fecha de la llamada a las urnas". El País.
57. (28 August 1982). "Calvo Sotelo disuelve el Parlamento y convoca elecciones generales para el 28 de octubre". El País.
58. (28 August 1982). "El 'goteo' de militantes de UCD hacia partidos centristas rivales, clave de la convocatoria anticipada". El País.
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61. {{harvp. Constitution. 1978
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63. {{harvp. Constitution. 1978
64. {{harvp. Constitution. 1978
65. {{harvp. Constitution. 1978
66. {{harvp. Royal Decree-Law 20/1977. 1977
67. {{harvp. Royal Decree-Law 20/1977. 1977
68. (31 August 1982). "Real Decreto 2076/1982, de 27 de agosto, por el que se dictan normas complementarias para las elecciones al Congreso de los Diputados y al Senado". Boletín Oficial del Estado.
69. Gallagher, Michael. (30 July 2012). "Effective threshold in electoral systems". [[Trinity College Dublin]].
70. {{harvp. Royal Decree-Law 20/1977. 1977
71. (27 August 1982). "Real Decreto 2057/1982, de 27 de agosto, de disolución de las Cortes Generales y fijación de la fecha de las elecciones".
72. {{harvp. Constitution. 1978
73. {{harvp. Royal Decree-Law 20/1977. 1977
74. {{harvp. Royal Decree-Law 20/1977. 1977
75. {{harvp. Constitution. 1978
76. {{harvp. Royal Decree-Law 20/1977. 1977
77. {{harvp. Constitution. 1978
78. {{harvp. Royal Decree-Law 20/1977. 1977
79. {{harvp. Constitution. 1978
80. {{harvp. Royal Decree-Law 20/1977. 1977
81. {{harvp. Constitution. 1978
82. {{harvp. Constitution. 1978
83. "Constitución española. Título V. De las relaciones entre el Gobierno y las Cortes Generales. Sinopsis artículo 115". [[Congress of Deputies]].
84. {{harvp. Royal Decree 2076/1982. 1982
85. (14 July 1982). "Lavilla, elegido presidente de UCD con la abstención de socialdemócratas y 'suaristas'". El País.
86. Gómez, Carlos. (9 August 1982). "Empresarios de Castilla, Cantabria y Rioja abogan ante Landelino Lavilla y Manuel Fraga por la coalición UCD-AP". El País.
87. Gómez, Carlos. (8 September 1982). "La banca contaba en financiar la coalición UCD-AP". El País.
88. Jauregui, Fernando. (31 August 1982). "UCD dividida entre la alianza con Fraga o el acercamiento a Suárez". El País.
89. Jauregui, Fernando. (1 September 1982). "Firme rechazo de Lavilla a una coalición con Alianza Popular". El País.
90. Prades, Joaquina. (2 September 1982). "Se intensifican las presiones sobre Lavilla para formar la coalición entre UCD y Alianza Popular". El País.
91. Prades, Joaquina. (12 September 1982). "Landelino Lavilla se presentó como un líder de una UCD alejada de Alianza Popular". El País.
92. (8 September 1982). "Fraga insiste en que la mayoría natural se hará, por arriba o por abajo". El País.
93. Unzueta, Patxo. (31 August 1982). "Intentos en la derecha vasca para conseguir una candidatura unitaria". El País.
94. (4 September 1982). "El secretariado de Unión de Centro Democrático aprueba la coalición con Alianza Popular en el País Vasco". El País.
95. Prades, Joaquina. (10 September 1982). "Landelino Lavilla y Antonio Garrigues Walker firman la alianza UCD-PDL para concurrir a las elecciones". El País.
96. Barroso, Miguel. (14 July 1982). "Constituido el Partido Demócrata Liberal que promueve Antonio Garrigues Walker". El País.
97. (20 September 1982). "Los liberales no se presentan a las elecciones tras la ruptura de la alianza con UCD". El País.
98. (16 August 1982). "La negativa de Suárez, principal escollo, para la coalición electoral de la UCD y el Centro Democrático y Social". El País.
99. Jauregui, Fernando. (17 August 1982). "El tema de las coaliciones preelectorales provoca nuevos enfrentamientos internos en UCD". El País.
100. Jauregui, Fernando. (9 May 1982). "La coalición entre Fernández Ordóñez y el Partido Socialista para las próximas elecciones, prácticamente decidida". El País.
101. de la Cuadra, Bonifacio. (3 September 1982). "El PAD apoya la convergencia socialdemócrata con el PSOE". El País.
102. (22 August 1982). "Las negociaciones para la coalición AP-PDP se reanudarán en septiembre". El País.
103. Prades, Joaquina. (11 September 1982). "AP y PDP irán también en coalición a las elecciones municipales". El País.
104. José Ignacio Wert. "The electoral campaign of 1982: The road to change". REIS.
105. "PSOE poster – 1982 general election". archivoelectoral.org.
106. "AP poster – 1982 general election". archivoelectoral.org.
107. "Decisive Catalonia". archivoelectoral.org.
108. "Very strong Catalonia". archivoelectoral.org.
109. "CiU poster – 1982 general election". archivoelectoral.org.
110. (26 May 1982). "PCE's leadership believes that the vote is polarizing between AP and PSOE". El País.
111. "PSOE 1982 jingle". archivoelectoral.org.
112. (27 October 1982). "'Future is ours, of the majority wishing a change', says Felipe González". El País.
113. (14 September 1982). "The PSOE will establish the retirement age at 64 and the 40-hours week work time". El País.
114. (17 September 1982). "The PSOE promises to create 800,000 jobs over the next four years". El País.
115. (11 September 1982). "If the PSOE wins by absolute majority it will paraphrase the permanence within NATO". El País.
116. (16 June 2014). "Year 1982: When the PSOE was Podemos". La Información.
117. (9 September 1982). "AP promises to cut taxes and complete the accession to NATO". El País.
118. (4 October 1982). "The dismantling of the attempted coup began after the visit of one of the detainees to Milans del Bosch". El País.
119. (2 October 1982). "The incorporation of the Army to democracy, a challenge for the PSOE, according to Alfonso Guerra". El País.
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124. Lozano, Carles. "Congreso de los Diputados: Votaciones más importantes".
125. (28 October 2007). "The Spain of Felipe: For change". El Mundo.
126. Javier Tussell. "The Socialists in power". artehistoria.com.
127. (19 February 1983). "The crisis of UCD culminates with the decision to dissolve it as a political party". El País.