Salafi jihadism

Definitions

In the words of Madawi al Rasheed, Salafi jihadism is "a hybrid construction deeply rooted in the last three decades of the twentieth century that is desperate to anchor itself in an authentic Islamic tradition, yet reflecting serious borrowing from the discourse of Western modernity".

According to Madawi Al Rasheed, ideology of Jihadi-Salafism is a post-modern hybridity whose sources can be found in the past and present, in both the Muslim world and Western world. Thus, it is the outcome of cross-fertilisation of sources that are both transnational and local, resulting in a devastating ideology that re-invents the past to induce a "cataclysmic war between two binary oppositions". Contemporary Salafi-Jihadis are primarily products of modernity rather than an extension of traditional Muslim societies. Thus, Jihadis seek to create a mimicry of the West of which they want to be part of, but reject the other leading to violence. However, more than the ideology itself, it is the circumstances that explain the appeal of Jihadis which is the real cause of violence. The traditional Mujahideen of the previous eras, such as ‘Omar al-Mukhtar, ‘Abd al-Qadir, al-Jaza’iri and ‘Izz al-Din al-Qassam were a different category of people, products of different social circumstances who sought to liberate occupied lands from foreign imperialist and colonial penetrations. Although they gained solidarity across the Islamic World, they were not transnational actors. Salafi-Jihadis on the other hand, die for an imagined globalised faith, shares Western modernity (despite its critique), and advocate a neo-liberal free-market rationale, in their quest for a global World Order. Thus Jihadi-Salafism has as much to do with the West as with Salafism or religion in general.

Another definition of Salafi jihadism, offered by Mohammed M. Hafez, is an "extreme form of Sunni Islamism that rejects democracy and Shia rule". Hafez distinguished them from apolitical and conservative Salafi scholars (such as Muhammad Nasiruddin al-Albani, Muhammad ibn al Uthaymeen, Abd al-Aziz ibn Baz, Wasiullah Abbas, Zubair Ali Zai, and Abdul-Azeez ibn Abdullaah Aal ash-Shaikh) but also from the sahwa movement associated with Salman al-Ouda or Safar Al-Hawali. According to Michael Horowitz, Salafi jihad is an ideology that identifies the "alleged source of the Muslims' conundrum" in the "persistent attacks and humiliation of Muslims on the part of an anti-Islamic alliance of what it terms 'Crusaders', 'Zionists', and 'apostates'." The concept was described by the American-Israeli scholar Martin Kramer as an academic term that "will inevitably be [simplified to] jihadism or the jihadist movement in popular usage."

Tenets

According to political scientist Gilles Kepel, Salafist jihadism combined "respect for the sacred texts in their most literal form, ... with an absolute commitment to jihad, whose number-one target had to be America, perceived as the greatest enemy of the faith." 13th-century Hanbalite jurist Taqi al-Din Ahmad ibn Taymiyya (1328 C.E/ 728 A.H), a maverick cleric known for his fierce anti-Mongol stances, is the most authoritative classical theologian in Salafi-jihadist discourse.

According to Mohammed M. Hafez, contemporary jihadi Salafism is characterized by "five features":

• immense emphasis on the concept of tawhid (unity of God);
• God's sovereignty (hakimiyyat Allah), which defines right and wrong, good and evil, and which supersedes human reasoning is applicable in all places on earth and at all times, and makes unnecessary and un-Islamic other ideologies such as liberalism or humanism;
• the rejection of all religious innovation (bid‘ah) in Islam;
• the permissibility and necessity of takfir (the declaring of a Muslim to be outside the creed, so that they may face execution);
• and on the centrality of jihad against infidel regimes.

Another researcher, Thomas Hegghammer, has outlined five objectives shared by jihadis:

• Changing the social and political organisation of the state (an example, being the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) and the former Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) which fought to overthrow the Algerian state and replace it with an Islamic state).
• Establishing sovereignty on a territory perceived as occupied or dominated by non-Muslims (an example being the Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba (Soldiers of the Pure) in Indian-administered Kashmir and the Caucasus Emirate in the Russian Federation).
• Defending the Muslim community (ummah) from external non-Muslim perceived threats, either the "near enemy" (al-adou al-qarib, this includes jihadists Arabs who travelled to Bosnia and Chechnya to defend local Muslims against non-Muslim armies) or the "far enemy" (al-adou al-baid, often affiliates of Al-Qaeda attacking the West).
• Correcting other Muslims' moral behaviour. (In Indonesia, vigilantes first used sticks and stones to attack those they considered "deviant" in behavior before moving on to guns and bombs.)
• Intimidating and marginalising other Muslim sects (an example being Lashkar-e-Jhangvi which has carried out violent attacks on Pakistani Shia for decades, and killings in Iraq).

Robin Wright notes the importance in Salafi jihadist groups of

• the formal process of taking an oath of allegiance (Bay'ah) to a leader. (This can be by individuals to an emir or by a local group to a transglobal group.)
• "marbling", i.e. pretending to cut ties to a less-than-popular global movement when "strategically or financially convenient". (An example is the cutting of ties to al-Qaeda by the Syrian group Al-Nusra Front with al-Qaeda's approval.)

Al Jazeera journalist Jamal Al Sharif describes Salafi jihadism as combining "the doctrinal content and approach of Salafism and organisational models from Muslim Brotherhood organisations. Their motto emerged as 'Salafism in doctrine, modernity in confrontation.

Differences from Quietist and Islamist Salafism

Much of Salafi-Jihadist discourse borrows heavily from Sayyid Qutb's concept of jahiliyya (pre-Islamic ignorance), hakimiyya (Sovereignty of God) and takfir (excommunication). Prominent contemporary ideologues of Salafi jihadism, such as Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi and Abu Qatada al Filistini, drew heavily from the works of Sayyid Qutb and adopted concepts of Al-Wala wal Bara from his writings. Maqdisi’s interpretation of Al-Wala wal Bara marked a distinct shift from traditional Salafi theology by introducing Takfiri principles to it. Adopting a binary world-view, Maqdisi excommunicated contemporary governments in the Muslim World and their collaborators as apostates. Salafi Jihadists also reject democracy as it contradicts their interpretation of Hakimiyya. Salafi Islamists, while supporting revolutions to topple authoritarian regimes, permit the participation in democratic systems across the world to Islamize the political order through the existing structures. These revolutionary Islamist doctrines advocating violent overthrow of the existing political order, is seen as heretical by Quietist Salafis.{{Cite web|last=Farid Shapoo | first=Sajid| date=19 July 2017 |title= Salafi Jihadism – An Ideological Misnomer

Salafi jihadists distinguish themselves from Quietist salafis whom they label "sheikist", so named because – the jihadists believe – that the "sheikists" had forsaken adoration of God for adoration of "the oil sheiks of the Arabian peninsula, with the Al Saud family at their head". Principal among the sheikist scholars was Abd al-Aziz ibn Baz – "the archetypal court ulema [ulama al-balat]". These allegedly "false" salafi "had to be striven against and eliminated", but even more infuriating was the Salafi Islamists of the Muslim Brotherhood, whom the Salafi jihadists considered excessively moderate and lacking in a stricter literalist interpretation of holy texts.

Quietist Salafi scholarship in turn, denounce Salafi jihadism as a heterodox ideology far-removed from Salafi orthodoxy.|group=Note}} Salafi jihadists contend that they are not dividing the Muslim community because, in their view, the rulers of Muslim-majority countries and other self-proclaimed Muslims they attack have deviated from Islam and are actually apostates or false Muslims.

Quietist Salafis criticize Al-Qaeda and Islamic State as Qutbists and often label Salafi Islamists as "Surooris". According to them, these organizations are directly opposed to Salafiyya and its manhaj (methodology). Major doctrines of the Salafi Jihadist movement have its roots in early heterodox sects such as the Kharijites. As a result, heavy creedal disparities exist between traditional Salafis and Salafi Jihadists. Mainstream Salafism, which consists of both quietist and political Salafis, reject the violence of Jihadists. Major Purist Salafi ulema condemn certain Salafi-jihadist organisations as Kharijites.

History

Origins

The Egyptian Islamist movements of 1950s are generally considered to be the precursors of contemporary Salafi-Jihadist movements. The theological doctrines of the Syrian-Egyptian Islamic scholar Sayyid Rashid Rida (1865–1935 CE) greatly influenced these movements. Amongst his notable ideas included reviving the traditions of the early Muslim generations (Salaf) as well ridding the Islamic World of Western influences and Jahiliyya by specifically looking up to the model of Khulafa Rashidun. Rida's ideas would set the foundations of future Salafi-Jihadist movements and greatly influence Islamists like Hasan al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb, and other Islamic fundamentalist figures. Rashid Rida fervently opposed Western ideas and foreign influences, and his activities were focused on overturning the encroachment of secular laws across the Muslim World following the First World War. Rida believed that deference to man-made laws was tantamount to the polytheism of "Jahiliyya" and campaigned for the re-establishment of a Sunni Caliphate that would unite the Muslims. Only this, Rida asserted, alongside the "return to true and pure Islam" exemplified by the tenets of the Salafiyya movement; could liberate Muslim World from colonialism and restore past Islamic glory. Rida's treatises laid the theological framework of future militants who would eventually establish the Salafi-Jihadi movement.

Fore-runners of Salafi jihadism principally includes Egyptian militant Islamist scholar and theoretician Sayyid Qutb, who developed "the intellectual underpinnings", in the 1950s, for what would later become the doctrine of most Jihadist organizations around the world, including Al-Qaeda and ISIS. Going radically further than his predecessors, Qutb called upon Muslims to form an ideologically committed vanguard that would wage armed Jihad against the secular and Western-allied governments in the Arab World, until the restoration of Islamic rule. Sayyid Qutb's brother, Muhammad Qutb was one of Osama bin Laden’s teachers at university. Sayyid Qutb has been described as "Al-Qaeda's Philosopher". Ayman al Zawahiri, the Egyptian who was second in command and co-founder of Al-Qaeda, called Qutb, "the most prominent theoretician of the fundamentalist movements".

In his writings, both before and after joining the Muslim Brotherhood Qutb argued that the Muslim world had reached a crisis point and that the Islamic world has been replaced by pagan ignorance of Jahiliyyah, (which directly translates to "ignorance", a term used by Muslims to describe the "dark" ages of pre-Islamic Arabia). When Qutb went abroad for a two-year scholarship to the United States, it is said he came back with extremist radical beliefs. He used what's been often described by scholars as his "genuine literary excellence" to spread these views of western criticism to form the main intellectual doctrine for the Muslim Brotherhood, which later be adopted by most terrorist organizations worldwide.

Qutbism doctrine of Islam interpretation emphasizes how the secular, infidel Muslim leaders and populations have fallen to imitating the western way of life, and that before any prosperity would occur, the Muslim world must revert to the Caliphate-age Shari'ah Law instead of "Man-made laws". He issued ideological & religious debates stating that the violent means are justifiable under Islamic Law for an end as great as returning the Islamic State "days of glory", and these means are often leading a victorious violent holy war (Jihad) against the West.

A part of his writings which have influenced Islamists and terrorist organizations on the nature of The West, can be found in his book "The America that I Have Seen", which he wrote immediately after returning to Egypt from the United States. In it he complained of Western materialism, individual freedoms, economic system, racism, brutal boxing matches, "poor" haircuts, superficiality in conversations and friendships, restrictions on divorce, enthusiasm for sports, lack of artistic feeling, "animal-like" mixing of the sexes (which "went on even in churches"), and strong support for the new Israeli state.

He was appalled by what he perceived as loose sexual openness of American men and women. Qutb noted with disapproval the openly displayed sexuality of American women stating in the same influential book The America that I Have Seen:

On 29 August 1966, Sayyid Qutb was executed by hanging by Egyptian president's Gamal Abdel-Nasser's regime for his alleged role in the president's assassination plot. This would later paint him as an Islamic martyr or shahid (he is often called "Shahid Sayyid Qutb" or Sayyid Qutb al-Shahid by admirers) among supporters & Islamist circles, particularly as the trial was alleged to be a show trial. Qutb wrote his major Islamist works (a commentary of the Qur'an, Fi Zilal al-Qur'an (In the Shade of the Qur'an), and a manifesto of political Islam called Ma'alim fi-l-Tariq (Milestones), while incarcerated and allegedly tortured. This, alongside his allegedly extrajudicial execution, elevated the value of these two major writings, giving his radical, violent Islamist doctrine in his writings a stronger influence over future terrorist organizations.

Evolution of Salafi jihadism

During the Cold War, the United States and the United Kingdom, launched covert and overt campaigns to encourage and strengthen fundamentalist groups in the Middle East and southern Asia. These groups were seen as a hedge against potential expansion by the Soviet Union, and as a counterweight against nationalist and socialist movements that were seen as a threat to the interests of the Western nations.

In a 2018 interview with The Washington Post, Mohammed bin Salman, the de facto ruler of Saudi Arabia, said that Saudi Arabia's International propagation of the Salafi movement and Wahhabism campaign was "rooted in the Cold War, when allies asked Saudi Arabia to use its resources to prevent inroads in Muslim countries by the Soviet Union." According to some estimates, since the 1960s, the Saudis have funnelled over USD 100 billion into funding schools and mosques all over the world with the mission of spreading puritanical Wahhabi Salafi Islam. According to political scientist Alex Alexiev, the impetus for the international propagation of Salafism and Wahhabism was "the largest worldwide propaganda campaign ever mounted", David A. Kaplan described it as "dwarfing the Soviets' propaganda efforts at the height of the Cold War". In 2013, the European Parliament identified Wahhabism as the main source of global terrorism.

The crushing defeat of various Arab states in the 1967 Six-Day War led to the de-legitimization of socialist and nationalist ideologies across the Arab world. Their demise provided a fertile ground for the Salafiyya movement, which spread across the Arab world as well as the wider Islamic world. The rise of oil industry in Gulf states also brought in a large-workforce. The workforce embraced Salafi doctrines and founded Salafi organisations as they returned to their home-countries.

Beginning from 1970s, various Islamist and Jihadist factions attempted to idealize traditional Salafiyya, recasting it as a totalizing political system based on the doctrines of Sayyid Qutb. Majority of Salafis traditionally viewed Salafiyya as a scholarly movement that revived the religious faith of Muslims through teaching and devout adherence to Islamic decrees. Additionally, they advocated Salafism to remain uncontaminated from politics. However, a minority sought the establishment of an Islamic system through violent means, based on Sayyid Qutb's concepts of Hakimiyya (Sovereignty of God). They advocated a global Jihad, with clear political overtones, to fight for Muslim liberation across national boundaries. This movement came to be known as Salafi-Jihadism. Groups like Takfir wal-Hijra, who kidnapped and murdered an Egyptian ex-government minister in 1978, also inspired some of "the tactics and methods" used by Al Qaeda.

Expansion

Gilles Kepel writes that the Salafis whom he encountered in Europe in the 1980s, were "totally apolitical".

In the 1990s, militant Islamists of the al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya were active in the terrorist attacks on police, government officials, and foreign tourists in Egypt, and the Armed Islamic Group of Algeria was a principal extremist group in the Algerian Civil War.

In his research, Seth Jones of the Rand Corporation finds that Salafi-jihadist numbers and activity have increased from 2007 to 2013. According to his research:

• the number of Salafi jihadist groups increased by over 50% from 2010 to 2013, using Libya and parts of Syria as sanctuary.
• the number of Salafi jihadist fighters "more than doubled from 2010 to 2013" using both low and high estimates. The war in Syria was the single most important attraction for Salafi-jihadist fighters.
• attacks by al-Qaeda–affiliated groups (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, al Shabaab, Jabhat al-Nusrah, and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula)
• despite al-Qaeda's traditional focus on the "far enemy" (US and Europe), approximately 99% of the attacks by al-Qaeda and its affiliates in 2013 were against "near enemy" targets (in North Africa, the Middle East, and other regions outside of the West).

Leaders, groups and activities

Leaders

"Theoreticians" of Salafist jihadism included Afghan jihad veterans such as the Palestinian Abu Qatada, the Syrian Mustafa Setmariam Nasar, the Egyptian Mustapha Kamel, known as Abu Hamza al-Masri. Osama bin Laden was its most well-known leader. The dissident Saudi preachers Salman al-Ouda and Safar Al-Hawali, were held in high esteem by this school. Al Qaeda leader Ayman Al Zawahiri would praise Sayyid Qutb, stating that Qutb's call formed the ideological inspiration for the contemporary Salafi-Jihadist movement. Other leading figures in the movement include Anwar al-Awlaki, former leader of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP); Abu Bakar Bashir, leader of the banned Indonesian militant group (Jema'ah Islamiyah); Nasir al-Fahd, Saudi Arabian Salafi-Jihadist scholar who opposes the Saudi state, and reportedly pledged allegiance to ISIS; Mohammed Yusuf, the founder of the Nigerian Boko Haram; Omar Bakri Muhammad, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, leader of terrorist group Islamic State of Iraq and Levant; etc.

Development

Murad al-Shishani of The Jamestown Foundation states there have been three generations of Salafi-jihadists: those waging jihad in Afghanistan, Bosnia and Iraq. As of the mid-2000s, Arab fighters in Iraq were "the latest and most important development of the global Salafi-jihadi movement". These fighters were usually not Iraqis, but volunteers who had come to Iraq from other countries, mainly Saudi Arabia. Unlike in earlier Salafi jihadi actions, Egyptians "are no longer the chief ethnic group". According to Bruce Livesey Salafist jihadists are currently a "burgeoning presence in Europe, having attempted more than 30 terrorist attacks among EU countries" from September 2001 to the beginning of 2005".

According to Mohammed M. Hafez, in Iraq jihadi salafi are pursuing a "system-collapse strategy" whose goal is to install an "Islamic emirate based on Salafi dominance, similar to the Taliban regime in Afghanistan." In addition to occupation/coalition personnel they target mainly Iraqi security forces and Shia civilians, but also "foreign journalists, translators and transport drivers and the economic and physical infrastructure of Iraq."

Groups

Salafist jihadist groups include Al Qaeda, the now defunct Algerian Armed Islamic Group (GIA), and the Egyptian group Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya which still exists.

In the Algerian Civil War 1992–1998, the GIA was one of the two major Islamist armed groups (the other being the Armee Islamique du Salut or AIS) fighting the Algerian army and security forces. The GIA included veterans of the Afghanistan jihad and unlike the more moderate AIS, fought to destabilize the Algerian government with terror attacks designed to "create an atmosphere of general insecurity". It considered jihad in Algeria fard ayn or an obligation for all (sane adult male) Muslims, the GIA eventually lost popular support and was crushed by the security forces. Remnants of the GIA continued on as "Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat", which as of 2015 calls itself al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.

Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya, (the Islamic Group) another Salafist-jihadi movement fought an insurgency against the Egyptian government from 1992 to 1998 during which at least 800 Egyptian policemen and soldiers, jihadists, and civilians were killed. Outside of Egypt it is best known for a November 1997 attack at the Temple of Hatshepsut in Luxor where fifty-eight foreign tourists trapped inside the temple were hunted down and hacked and shot to death. The group declared a ceasefire in March 1999, although as of 2012 it is still active in jihad against the Ba'athist Syrian regime.

Perhaps the most famous and effective Salafist jihadist group was Al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda evolved from the Maktab al-Khidamat (MAK), or the "Services Office", a Muslim organization founded in 1984 to raise and channel funds and recruit foreign mujahideen for the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan. It was established in Peshawar, Pakistan, by Osama bin Laden and Abdullah Yusuf Azzam. As it became apparent that the jihad had compelled the Soviet military to abandon its mission in Afghanistan, some mujahideen called for the expansion of their operations to include Islamist struggles in other parts of the world, and Al Qaeda was formed by bin Laden on August 11, 1988. Members were to making a pledge (bayat) to follow one's superiors. Al-Qaeda emphasized jihad against the "far enemy", by which it meant the United States. In 1996, it announced its jihad to expel foreign troops and interests from what they considered Islamic lands, and in 1998, it issued a fatwa calling on Muslims to kill Americans and their allies whenever and wherever they could. Among its most notable acts of violence were the 1998 bombings of US embassies in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi that killed over 200 people; and the 9/11 attacks of 2001 that killed almost 3,000 people and caused many billions of dollars in damage.

According to Mohammed M. Hafez, "as of 2006 the two major groups within the jihadi Salafi camp" in Iraq were the Mujahidin Shura Council and the Ansar al Sunna Group. There are also a number of small jihadist Salafist groups in Azerbaijan.

The group leading the Islamist insurgency in Southern Thailand in 2006 by carrying out most of the attacks and cross-border operations, BRN-Koordinasi, favours Salafi ideology. It works in a loosely organized strictly clandestine cell system dependent on hard-line religious leaders for direction.

Jund Ansar Allah is, or was, an armed Salafist jihadist organization in the Gaza Strip. On August 14, 2009, the group's spiritual leader, Sheikh Abdel Latif Moussa, announced during Friday sermon the establishment of an Islamic emirate in the Palestinian territories attacking the ruling authority, the Islamist group Hamas, for failing to enforce Sharia law. Hamas forces responded to his sermon by surrounding his Ibn Taymiyyah mosque complex and attacking it. In the fighting that ensued, 24 people (including Sheikh Abdel Latif Moussa himself) were killed and over 130 were wounded.

In 2011, Salafist jihadists were actively involved with protests against King Abdullah II of Jordan, and the kidnapping and killing of Italian peace activist Vittorio Arrigoni in Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip.

In the North Caucasus region of Russia, the Caucasus Emirate replaced the nationalism of Muslim Chechnya and Dagestan with a hard-line Salafist-takfiri jihadist ideology. They are immensely focused on upholding the concept of tawhid (purist monotheism), and fiercely reject any practice of shirk, taqlid, ijtihad and bid‘ah. They also believe in the complete separation between the Muslim and the non-Muslim, by propagating Al Wala' Wal Bara' and declaring takfir against any Muslim who (they believe) is a mushrik (polytheist) and does not return to the observance of tawhid and the strict literal interpretation of the Quran and the Sunnah as followed by Muhammad and his companions (Sahaba).

In Syria and Iraq both Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIS have been described as Salafist-jihadist. Jabhat al-Nusra has been described as possessing "a hard-line Salafi-Jihadist ideology" and being one of "the most effective" groups fighting the regime. Writing after ISIS victories in Iraq, Hassan Hassan believes ISIS is a reflection of "ideological shakeup of Sunni Islam's traditional Salafism" since the Arab Spring, where salafism, "traditionally inward-looking and loyal to the political establishment", has "steadily, if slowly", been eroded by Salafism-jihadism.

Boko Haram in Nigeria is a Salafi jihadism group that has killed tens of thousands of people, displaced 2.3 million from their homes,

Activities in Europe

France

Main article: Islam in France

In France, in 2015 police say that salafism is represented in 90 out of 2500 investigated religious communities, which was double the number compared to five years earlier. In November and December 2016, authorities closed four salafist mosque in Ecquevilly, the El Islah mosque in Villiers-sur-Marne and two in Seine-Saint-Denis (Clichy-sous-Bois and Stains).

In December 2017, a salafi-Jihadist mosque in Marseille was closed by authorities for preaching about violent jihad. In August 2018, after the European Court of Human Rights approved the decision, French authorities deported the salafi-Jihadist preacher Elhadi Doudi to his home country Algeria because of his radical messages he spread in Marseille.

Germany

According to Deutsche Welle, Salafism is a growing movement in Germany whose aim of a Caliphate is incompatible with a Western democracy. According to the German Federal Agency for Civic Education, nearly all Islamist terrorists are Salafists, but not all Salafists are terrorists. Therefore, the agency evaluated the Salafist movement beyond the actions by Salafists and analysed the ideological framework of Salafism which is in conflict with the minimal foundations of a democratic and open society. Salafists calling for the death penalty for apostasy is in conflict with freedom of religion. The dualistic view on "true believers" and "false believers" in practice means people being treated unequally on religious grounds. The call for a religious state in the form of a caliphate means that Salafists reject the rule of law and the sovereignty of the people's rule. The Salafist view on gender and society leads to discrimination and the subjugation of women.

Estimates by German interior intelligence service show that it grew from 3,800 members in 2011 to 7,500 members in 2015. In Germany, most of the recruitment to the movement is done on the Internet and also on the streets, a propaganda drive which mostly attracts youth. There are two ideological camps, one advocates Salafi-Activism and directs its recruitment efforts towards non-Muslims and non-Salafist Muslims to gain influence in society. The other and minority movement, the jihadist Salafism, advocates gaining influence by the use of violence and nearly all identified terrorist cells in Germany came from Salafist circles.

In 2015, Sigmar Gabriel, Vice-Chancellor of Germany, spoke out, saying "We need Saudi Arabia to solve the regional conflicts, but we must at the same time make clear that the time to look away is past. Wahhabi mosques are financed all over the world by Saudi Arabia. In Germany, many dangerous Islamists come from these communities."Reuters , 6 December 2015, German Vice Chancellor warns Saudi Arabia over Islamist funding.

Deutsche Welle , 6 December 2015, German vice-chancellor warns Saudi Arabia over Islamist funding in Germany In November 2016, nationwide raids were conducted on the Salafi-Islamist True Religion organization.

According to the German Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution in Cologne, the number of Salafists in Germany grew from 9,700 in December 2016 to 10,800 in December 2017. In addition to the rise, the Salafist movement in Germany was increasingly fractured which made them harder to monitor by authorities. According to the office, street distributions of Quran took place less frequently which was described as a success for the authorities. Radicalisation changed character, from taking place in mosques and interregional Salafist organisations to more often happening in small circles, which increasingly formed on the internet. A further development was a rise in participation of women. According to the FFGI at Goethe University Frankfurt, wahhabist ideology is spread in Germany as in other European country mostly by an array of informal, personal and organisational networks, where organisations closely associated with the government of Saudi Arabia such as the Muslim World League (WML) and the World Association of Muslim Youth are actively participating.

In February 2017, the German Salafist mosque organisation Berliner Fussilet-Moscheeverein was banned by authorities. Anis Amri, the perpetrator of the 2016 Berlin truck attack, was said to be among its visitors. In March 2017, the German Muslim community organisation Deutschsprachige Islamkreis Hildesheim was also banned after investigators found that its members were preparing to travel to the conflict zone in Syria to fight for the Islamic State. According to the Federal Agency for Civic Education, these examples show that certain Salafist mosques not only concern themselves with religious matters, but also prepare serious crimes and terrorist activities.

Sweden

Main article: Islam in Sweden#Salafism

Representatives from the mosque in Gävle are promoting this variant of Islam, which is considered extreme in Sweden. According to researcher Aje Carlbom at Malmö University the organisation which is behind the missionary work is the Swedish United Dawah Center, abbreviated SUDC. SUDC is characterised as a salafist group by a researcher of religious history at Stockholm University and it has many links to the British Muslim Abdur Raheem Green.

In Hässleholm the Ljusets moské (translated: "mosque of the light") is spreading salafi ideology and portray shia Muslims as apostates and traitors in social media while the atrocities of the Islamic state are never mentioned. In 2009 the imam Abu al-Hareth at the mosque was sentenced to six years in jail for the attempted murder of a local shia Muslim from Iraq and another member set fire to a shia mosque in Malmö. In 2017, Swedish Security Police reported that the number of jihadists in Sweden had risen to thousands from about 200 in 2010. Based on social media analysis, an increase was noted in 2013. According to police in Sweden, salafist-Jihadists affect the communities where they are active.

According to Swedish researcher Magnus Ranstorp, salafi-Jihadism is antidemocratic, homophobic and aims to subjugate women and is therefore opposed to a societal order founded on democracy. According to , the salafi movement is present at nearly every major mosque in Sweden "in some form".

United Kingdom

Main article: Islam in the United Kingdom

The report found that Middle Eastern nations are providing financial support to mosques and Islamic educational institutions, which have been linked to the spread of Salafi-Jihadist materials which expoused "an illiberal, bigoted" ideology.

List of groups

According to Seth G. Jones at the RAND Corporation, as of 2014, there were around 50 Salafist-jihadist groups in existence or recently in existence ("present" in the list indicates a group's continued existence as of 2014). (Jones defines Salafi-jihadist groups as those groups which emphasize the importance of returning to a "pure" form of Islam, the form of Islam which was practiced by the Salaf, the pious ancestors; and those groups which believe that violent jihad is fard ‘ayn (a personal religious duty).

Ruling strategy

In several places and times, jihadis have taken control of an area and they have ruled it as an Islamic state, such as ISIL in Syria and Iraq.

Among jihadists, establishing an uncompromising form of sharia law is a core value and goal, but strategies differ over how quickly this should be done. Observers such as the journalist Robert Worth have described jihadis as being torn between wanting to build a truly Islamic order gradually from the bottom up in order to avoid alienating non-jihadi Muslims (the desire of Osama bin Laden), and not wanting to wait for the creation of an Islamic state.

In Zinjibar, Yemen, AQAP established an "emirate" which lasted from May 2011 until the summer of 2012. It emphasized (and publicized with a media campaign) "uncharacteristically gentle" good governance over its conquered territory rather than strict enforcement of sharia law—rebuilding infrastructure, quashing banditry, and resolving legal disputes. One jihadi veteran of Yemen described its approach towards the local population:

However AQAP's "clemency drained away under the pressure of war", and the area was taken back by the government. The failure of this model (according to New York Times correspondent Robert Worth), may have "taught" jihadis a lesson on the need to instill fear.

ISIS is believed to have used a manifesto which is titled "The Management of Savagery" as its model. The manifesto emphasizes the need to create areas of "savagery"—i.e., lawlessness—in enemy territory. Once the enemy was too exhausted and weakened from the lawlessness (particularly terrorism) to continue to try to govern its territory, the nucleus of a new caliphate could be established in its place. The author of "The Management of Savagery", did not place a lot of emphasis on winning the sympathy of local Muslims, instead, he placed a lot of emphasis on the use of extreme violence, writing that: "One who previously engaged in jihad knows that it is naught but violence, crudeness, terrorism, frightening [others] and massacring – I am talking about jihad and fighting, not about Islam and one should not confuse them.")

Views on violence

In recent years, the Salafi methodology has come to be associated with the jihad of extremist groups that advocate the killing of innocent civilians. The European Parliament, in a report commissioned in 2013, claimed that Wahhabi and Salafi-Jihadi groups are involved, mainly via Saudi charities, in the support and supply of arms to rebel groups around the world. Some Salafi scholars appear to support violent extremism. The Egyptian Salafi-Jihadist cleric Mahmoud Shaaban "appeared on a religious television channel calling for the deaths of main opposition figures Mohammed ElBaradei – a Nobel Peace Prize laureate – and former presidential candidate Hamdeen Sabahi". Some other Islamic groups, particularly amongst Sufis, have also complained about extremism among some Salafi.

According to the British Researcher Anabel Inge:"While aspects of their purist creed are shared by Jihadi groups, most—probably the vast majority of—Salafis in Europe are explicitly against terrorism. ... In Britain, the 'Salafi' label has been associated with non-violent, often quietist groups. ... One preacher, for instance, encouraged his online followers to 'mass distribute' an anti-ISIS leaflet he had written, in which he urged anyone with information about terrorist plots to 'inform the authorities'. That same preacher reported receiving death threats from ISIS sympathizers. ... I found no evidence of so-called brainwashing. On the contrary, I found that the Salafi conversion process was largely intellectual, rather than based on social or other pressures."

Traditional Salafis have rejected the use of violence by Salafi-Jihadists. The Saudi scholar Muhammad ibn al Uthaymeen considered suicide bombing to be unlawful and the scholar Abdul Muhsin al-Abbad wrote a treatise entitled: According to which intellect and Religion is Suicide bombings and destruction considered Jihad?. Muhammad Nasiruddin al-Albani stated that "History repeats itself. Everybody claims that the Prophet is their role model. Our Prophet spent the first half of his message making dawah, and he did not start it with jihad". The vast majority of Salafis reject violence, viewing most Salafi-Jihadist groups as deviants, and are amongst their most vehement critics. It has been noted that the Western association of Salafism with violence stems from writings "through the prism of security studies" that were published in the late 20th century and that continue to persist.

Condemnations and challenges by Muslims

Many Muslim leaders, scholarly figures and dozens of Islamic councils have denounced Salafi jihadism as deviant. Numerous Islamic scholars, of both Salafi and non-Salafi persuasions, have written treatises in which they have compared certain Salafi Jihadists groups like Islamic State to Kharijites. Some scholars, Western policy institutes, and political scientists have asserted that Salafi-Jihadism can be a gateway to violent extremism and terrorism.

According to Western analysts, obstacles in countering Salafi jihadism are funding from oil-rich Gulf nations and private donations which are difficult to track, Saudi efforts to propagate Salafiyya movement throughout the Muslim world, resentment for Western hegemony, authoritarian Arab regimes, feeling defenseless against foreign aggression and that "Muslim blood is cheap," weak governance, extremist Salafi preaching that counters moderate voices, and other challenges.

Dutch political scientist Alex P. Schmid states: "Salafist Jihadism (al-Salafiyya al-Jihadiyya) has managed to establish itself as the dominant ideology of rebellion in the early 21st century, just as Fascism and Communism had been the most violent ideologies of the twentieth century. For a brief moment in 2011, the Arab Spring with its non-violent mass demonstrations, seemed to offer an alternative model of rebellion in the absence of democratic regimes but when these mass uprisings were crushed in all countries except Tunisia, jihadism as a non-mass based method of fighting repression and foreign intervention gained the upper hand in the minds of many militant youths."

Notes

Explanatory notes

Citations

References

1. Amghar, Cavatorta, Samir, Francesco. (17 March 2023). "Salafism in the contemporary age: Wiktorowicz revisited". Contemporary Islam.
2. Sedgwick, Mark. (2015). "Jihadism, Narrow and Wide: The Dangers of Loose Use of an Important Term". Perspectives on Terrorism.
3. Ashour, Omar. (July 2011). "Post-Jihadism: Libya and the Global Transformations of Armed Islamist Movements". Terrorism and Political Violence.
4. Kepel, ''Jihad'', 2002, pp. 220-222
5. (2021). "Handbook of Islamic Sects and Movements". [[Brill Publishers]].
6. French, Nathan S.. (2020). "And God Knows the Martyrs: Martyrdom and Violence in Jihadi-Salafism". [[Oxford University Press]].
7. (October 2019). "Conspiratorial Narratives in Violent Political Actors' Language". [[SAGE Publications]].
8. (2008). "The Globalization of Martyrdom: Al Qaeda, Salafi Jihad, and the Diffusion of ...". JHU Press.
9. (2021). "Homegrown: ISIS in America". [[I.B. Tauris]].
10. "Jihadist-Salafism" is introduced by Gilles Kepel, ''Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam'' (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2002) pp.219-222
11. Deneoux, Guilain (June 2002). "The Forgotten Swamp: Navigating Political Islam". ''Middle East Policy''. pp. 69–71."
12. Kepel used it to refer to international volunteers of the [[jihad]] against the [[Soviet Union]] in [[Afghanistan]], who, after the Soviet withdrawal and loss of American-Saudi funding, sought new paths to engage in jihad.Kepel, ''Jihad'', 2002, p.218-220
13. El-Baghdadi, Iyad. "Salafis, Jihadis, Takfiris: Demystifying Militant Islamism in Syria". 15 January 2013.
14. "Indonesia: Why Salafism and Terrorism Mostly Don't Mix". [[International Crisis Group]].
15. Kelvington, Michael R.. (25 March 2019). "Global Salafi-Jihadism Ideology: The "Soft Power" of the Enemy".
16. F. Forte, David. (19 October 2001). "Religion is Not the Enemy".
17. (2016). "Accusations of Unbelief in Islam: A Diachronic Perspective on Takfīr". [[Brill Publishers]].
18. Bolechów, Bartosz. (2022). "The Islamic State's Worldview as a Radical Terror Management Device". Studia Politologiczne.
19. (2017). "The Mind of the Islamic State". Prometheist Books.
20. (2012). "Routledge Handbook of Political Islam". [[Routledge]].
21. (April 2008). "Global Insurgency Strategy and the Salafi Jihad Movement". USAF Institute for National Security Studies at the [[USAF Academy]].
22. (April 30, 2013). "The Stagnation of Research on Terrorism". The Chronicle of Higher Education.
23. (January–February 2014). "America Unhinged". National Interest.
24. (2014). "A Persistent Threat: The Evolution of al Qa'ida and Other Salafi Jihadists". Rand Corporation.
25. (8 September 2021). "Twenty Years After 9/11: What Is the Future of the Global Jihadi Movement?". [[Combating Terrorism Center]].
26. Meijer, Roel. (2014). "Global Salafism: Islam's New Religious Movement". Oxford University Press.
27. Meijer, Roel. (2013). "Global Salafism: Islam's New Religious Movement". Oxford University Press.
28. (2007). "Suicide Bombers in Iraq By Mohammed M. Hafez". US Institute of Peace Press.
29. Horowitz, Michael. "Defining and confronting the Salafi Jihad". Middle East Strategy at Harvard.
30. Kramer, Martin. (Spring 2003). "Coming to Terms: Fundamentalists or Islamists?". [[Middle East Quarterly]].
31. (2006). "''Jihad'' By Gilles Kepel, Anthony F. Roberts". Bloomsbury Publishing PLC.
32. Ajjub, Orwa. (2021). "The Development of the Theological and Political Aspects of Jihadi-Salafism". Lund University.
33. (2009). "Global Salafism: Islam's New Religious Movement". Columbia University Press.
34. (December 12, 2016). "AFTER THE ISLAMIC STATE".
35. Al Sharif, Jamal. "Salafis in Sudan:Non-Interference or Confrontation". Al Jazeera Center for Studies.
36. Kelvington, Michael R.. (25 March 2019). "Global Salafi-Jihadism Ideology: The "Soft Power" of the Enemy".
37. (23 April 2019). "Muhammad Rashid Rida".
38. C. Martin, Richard. (2016). "Encyclopedia of Islam and the Muslim World, Second Edition". Gale Publishers.
39. A. Turner, John. (2014). "Religious Ideology and the Roots of the Global Jihad: Salafi Jihadism and International Order". Palgrave Macmillan.
40. M. Bennett, Andrew. (2013). "Islamic History & Al-Qaeda: A Primer to Understanding the Rise of Islamist Movements in the Modern World". PACE UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW.
41. R. Farmer, Brian. (2007). "Understanding Radical Islam: Medieval Ideology in the Twenty-first Century". Peter Land Publishing Inc..
42. (2017). "Terrorists' Use of the Internet: Assessment and Response". IOS Press.
43. Tran, Edwin. (2 March 2021). "Family tree of Islamist extremism".
44. [https://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/nov/01/afghanistan.terrorism3 Robert Irwin, "Is this the man who inspired Bin Laden?"] {{Webarchive. link. (2022-12-09 ''[[The Guardian]]'' (1 November 2001).)
45. [https://www.nytimes.com/2003/03/23/magazine/the-philosopher-of-islamic-terror.html Paul Berman, "The Philosopher of Islamic Terror"] {{Webarchive. link. (2022-12-09 , ''[[New York Times Magazine]]'' (23 March 2003).)
46. "Out of the Shadows: Getting ahead of prisoner radicalization".
47. Trevor Stanley. "The Evolution of Al-Qaeda: Osama bin Laden and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi".
48. (2019). "Sayyid Qutb and Aquinas: Liberalism, Natural Law and the Philosophy of Jihad". The Heythrop Journal.
49. Stahl, A.E. "'Offensive Jihad' in Sayyid Qutb's Ideology." International Institute for Counter-Terrorism.
50. Kepel, ''War for Muslim Minds'', (2004) pp. 174–75
51. Kepel, ''Jihad'', (2002), p. 51
52. ''[http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf The 9/11 Commission Report] {{Webarchive. link. (2018-12-21 '' (2004), Authorized Edition, pp. 50, 466 (n. 12).)
53. David Von Drehle, [http://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/a-lesson-in-hate-109822568/ A Lesson In Hate] {{Webarchive. link. (2022-12-04 ''Smithsonian Magazine'')
54. [http://www.currenttrends.org/research/detail/said-qutb-on-the-arts-in-america Excerpt] {{Webarchive. link. (2014-01-06 from Qutb's article "Amrika allati Ra'aytu" (The America That I Have Seen))
55. Qutb, ''Milestones'', p. 139
56. Calvert, John (2000), "'The World is an Undutiful Boy!': Sayyid Qutb's American Experience," ''Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations'', Vol. II, No. 1, pp. 87–103:98.
57. Berman, ''Terror and Liberalism'', (2003), p. 63
58. Ami Isseroff. (7 December 2008). "Sayyid Qutb".
59. Sivan (1985) p. 93.
60. Fouad Ajami, "In the Pharaoh's Shadow: Religion and Authority in Egypt," ''Islam in the Political Process'', editor James P. Piscatori, Cambridge University Press, 1983, pp. 25–26.
61. Hasan, S. Badrul, ''Syed Qutb Shaheed'', Islamic Publications International, 2nd ed. 1982
62. link. (10 May 2008 8 May 2008)
63. "Syed Qutb".
64. Dreyfuss, Robert. (2005). "Devil's game: how the United States helped unleash fundamentalist Islam". A Holt Paperback.
65. Davidson, Christopher M.. (2016). "Shadow Wars: The Secret Struggle for the Middle East". Oneworld Publications.
66. Curtis, Mark. (2012). "Secret affairs: Britain's collusion with radical Islam". Serpent's Tail.
67. Gowans, Stephen. (2019). "Israel, a Beachhead in the Middle East: From European Colony to US Power Projection Platform". Baraka Books.
68. (2018-03-23). "Saudi prince denies Kushner is ‘in his pocket’". The Washington Post.
69. (2016-01-30). "'Tsunami of money' from Saudi Arabia funding 24,000 Pakistan madrassas". The Economic Times.
70. Jr, Frank Gaffney. (2003-12-08). "Waging the 'War of Ideas'".
71. Jr, Frank Gaffney. (2003-12-08). "Waging the 'War of Ideas'".
72. Reporters, Telegraph. (2016-03-29). "What is Wahhabism? The reactionary branch of Islam from Saudi Arabia said to be 'the main source of global terrorism'". The Telegraph.
73. (2005). "The Salafist movement by Bruce Livesey". PBS Frontline.
74. "Jihadist-Salafism" is introduced by Gilles Kepel, ''Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam'' (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2002), p. 220
75. al-Saleh, Huda. (21 March 2018). "After Saudi Crown Prince's pledge to eliminate Brotherhood, Zawahri defends them".
76. Richey, Warren. "To turn tables on ISIS at home, start asking unsettling questions, expert says". Christian Science Monitor.
77. Scheuer, Michael. (20 January 2011). "Osama Bin Laden". Oxford University Press.
78. Dowd, Robert A.. (1 July 2015). "Christianity, Islam, and Liberal Democracy: Lessons from Sub-Saharan Africa". Oxford University Press.
79. Moghadam, Assaf. (1 May 2011). "The Globalization of Martyrdom: Al Qaeda, Salafi Jihad, and the Diffusion of Suicide Attacks". Johns Hopkins University Press.
80. (28 October 2019). "Who was Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi?". BBC.
81. (12 November 2019). "What radicalized ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi?, Iraq's post-2003 chaos is actually to blame, not Saddam Hussein". [[The Washington Post]].
82. "The Rise and Fall of Arab Fighters in Chechnya".
83. "Jihadist-Salafism" is introduced by Gilles Kepel, ''Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam'' (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2002), pp. 260–62
84. (24 March 2015). "Algeria country profile – Overview".
85. Gilles Kepel, ''Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam'' (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2002), pp. 260–75
86. (30 July 2004). ["Islamism, Violence and Reform in Algeria: Turning the Page (Islamism in North Africa III)]"](http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-africa/north-africa/algeria/029-islamism-violence-and-reform-in-algeria-turning-the-page.aspx). [[International Crisis Group]] Report.
87. (September 27, 2012). "Former militants of Egypt's Al-Gama'a al-Islamiya struggle for political success". Terrorism Monitor (Jamestown Foundation).
88. "al-Gama'at al-Islamiyya Jama'a Islamia (Islamic Group, IG)". FAS Intelligence Resource Program.
89. (2014). "A Persistent Threat: The Evolution of al Qa'ida and Other Salafi Jihadists". Rand Corporation.
90. Wander, Andrew. (July 13, 2008). "A history of terror: Al-Qaeda 1988–2008". The Guardian, The Observer.
91. (January 18, 2006). "The Osama bin Laden I know".
92. (2006). "The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11". Knopf.
93. Bennett, Brian. (12 June 2011). "Al Qaeda operative key to 1998 U.S. embassy bombings killed in Somalia". Los Angeles Times.
94. link. (2010-12-26. Terrorism Focus Volume: 4 Issue: 40, December 7, 2007, by: Anar Valiyev)
95. (September 8, 2006). "''A Breakdown of Southern Thailand's Insurgent Groups''.". The Jamestown Foundation.
96. [[Rohan Gunaratna]] & Arabinda Acharya, ''The Terrorist Threat from Thailand: Jihad Or Quest for Justice?''
97. Zachary Abuza, ''The Ongoing Insurgency in Southern Thailand'', INSS, p. 20
98. ''Al-Quds Al-Arabi'' (London), August 19, 2009.
99. (22 April 2011). "Jordan protests: Rise of the Salafist Jihadist movement".
100. (15 April 2011). "Body of Italian found in Gaza Strip house-Hamas". Reuters.
101. "Italian peace activist killed in Gaza". Al Jazeera English.
102. Darion Rhodes, [http://www.ict.org.il/Article/132/Salafist-Takfiri%20Jihadism%20the%20Ideology%20of%20the%20Caucasus%20Emirate Salafist-Takfiri Jihadism: the Ideology of the Caucasus Emirate] {{Webarchive. link. (2014-09-03, [[International Institute for Counter-Terrorism]], March 2014)
103. (16 August 2014). "Isis: a portrait of the menace that is sweeping my homeland".
104. Benotman, Noman. "Jabhat al-Nusra, A Strategic Briefing". Quilliam Foundation.
105. (2019). "Search Results Boko Haram: The History of an African Jihadist Movement". Princeton University Press.
106. "Nigeria's Boko Haram Kills 49 in Suicide Bombings".
107. (1 April 2015). "Le salafisme gagne du terrain chez les musulmans". [[Le Monde]].
108. RMC. (5 December 2016). "Mosquée salafiste fermée par l'État: " Ce qui dérange, c'est notre religiosité "".
109. (12 December 2017). "Une mosquée salafiste fermée à Marseille sur ordre de la préfecture".
110. (20 April 2018). "La France expulse un imam salafiste vers l'Algérie pour ses prêches radicaux".
111. (10 December 2017). "Zahl der Salafisten steigt in Deutschland auf Rekordhoch {{!}} Aktuell Deutschland". Deutsche Welle.
112. Pfahl-Traughber, Prof Dr Armin. (9 September 2015). "Salafismus – was ist das überhaupt? {{!}} bpb".
113. "(de) Salafistische Bestrebungen – Inhalte und Ziele salafistischer Ideologie". [[Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution]].
114. (19 November 2016). "Germany Cracks Down on Salafists to Shield Refugees". [[The New York Times]].
115. (15 November 2016). "'True religion:' How Salafists lure supporters". Deutsche Welle.
116. (15 November 2016). "Germany Bans 'True Religion' Muslim Group and Raids Mosques". [[The New York Times]].
117. Biskup, Lennart. (2017). "Saudi-Arabiens radikalisierender Einfluss auf Deutschlands Muslime". Frankfurter Forschungszentrums Globaler Islam (FFGI).
118. Jaschke, Hans-Gerd. "Orte der islamistischen Radikalisierung {{!}} bpb". bpb.de.
119. (7 September 2015). "(sv) Gävles moské vill sprida extrem tolkning av islam". [[Gefle Dagblad]].
120. (29 April 2016). "Tre olika Malmöföreningar ville lyssna på bin Ladins förra mentor". [[Sydsvenskan]].
121. "Moskéns ledning sprider extremism och hat". Expressen.
122. "Säpochefen: "Det finns tusentals radikala islamister i Sverige"". Aftonbladet.
123. Radio, Sveriges. (16 June 2017). "Säpo: Huge increase in violent Islamist extremists in Sweden – Radio Sweden". Sveriges Radio.
124. "Ekstremistisk islamisme vokser i Sverige". DR.
125. Doku. (29 July 2021). "Anas Khalifa – därför lämnade jag salafismen – Doku.nu".
126. (5 July 2017). "Saudi Arabia has 'clear link' to UK extremism, report says".
127. Elgot, Jessica. (4 July 2017). "Theresa May sitting on report on foreign funding of UK extremists". The Guardian.
128. (2014). "A Persistent Threat: The Evolution of al Qa'ida and Other Salafi Jihadists". Rand Corporation.
129. (2016). "A Rage for Order: The Middle East in Turmoil, from Tahrir Square to ISIS". Pan Macmillan.
130. (2016). "A Rage for Order: The Middle East in Turmoil, from Tahrir Square to ISIS". Pan Macmillan.
131. (2016). "A Rage for Order: The Middle East in Turmoil, from Tahrir Square to ISIS". Pan Macmillan.
132. (March 2015). "What ISIS Really Wants". The Atlantic.
133. Valentine, Simon Ross. (28 November 2014). "Force and Fanaticism: Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia and Beyond". Oxford University Press.
134. [https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/feb/09/violent-salafists-threaten-arab-spring-democracies The Observer] {{Webarchive. link. (2021-09-24 , ''Violent tide of Salafism threatens the Arab spring'', by Peter Beaumont and Patrick Kingsley, 10 February 2013.)
135. [https://www.reuters.com/article/us-egypt-elbaradei-cleric-idUSBRE91A0UZ20130211 Reuters] {{Webarchive. link. (2021-09-24 , ''Egypt orders cleric held over ElBaradei death call'', by Marwa Awad, edited by Paul Taylor and Jon Hemming, 11 February 2013.)
136. (2016-10-07). "6 common misconceptions about Salafi Muslims in the West".
137. Gabriel G. Tabarani, ''Jihad's New Heartlands: Why the West Has Failed to Contain Islamic Fundamentalism'', p. 26.
138. Richard Gauvain, ''Salafi Ritual Purity: In the Presence of God'', p. 331
139. Quintan Wiktorowicz, Anatomy of the Salafi Movement, p. 217.
140. Meleagrou-Hitchens, Alexander. (2018). "Salafism in America". The George Washington University.
141. Meijer, Roel. (2009). "Global Salafism: Islam's New Religious Movement". Columbia University Press.
142. Farid Shapoo, Sajid. (19 July 2017). "Salafi Jihadism – An Ideological Misnomer".
143. "PURITAN POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT: THE EVOLUTION OF SALAFISM IN MALAYSIA". Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict.
144. "Salafism in America". George Washington University.
145. (2016). "Islamism, Salafism, and jihadism: A primer".
146. "PUSHING THE JIHADIST GENIE BACK INTO THE BOTTLE".
147. (5 July 2014). "Prominent scholars declare ISIS caliphate 'null and void'". Middle East Monitor.
148. (24 September 2014). "Muslims Against ISIS Part 1: Clerics & Scholars". Wilson Center.
149. "Letter to Baghdadi".
150. (2015). "Refuting ISIS: Destroying Its Religious Foundations and Proving that it Has Strayed from Islam and that Fighting it is an Obligation". Sacred Knowledge.
151. "The Kingdom's Failed Marriage".
152. (17 May 2010). "Islam Divided Between Salafi-jihad and the Ikhwan". Studies in Conflict & Terrorism.
153. (15 February 2008). "The Salafi-Jihad as a Religious Ideology". Combating Terrorism Center at West Point.
154. (28 June 2015). "Kuwait Attack Renews Scrutiny of Terror Support Within Gulf States". Wall Street Journal.
155. "Saudi Funding of ISIS". Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
156. (May 2016). "The U.S.-Saudi Arabia counterterrorism relationship".
157. (2019). "Salafism in the Maghreb: Politics, Piety, and Militancy". Oxford University Press.
158. (16 February 2015). "Arab and Muslim blood is cheap".
159. "The Challenge of North African Salafism".
160. Bolechów, Bartosz. (2022). "The Islamic State's Worldview as a Radical Terror Management Device". Studia Politologiczne.
161. P. Schmid, Alex. (2017). "Public Opinion Survey Data to Measure Sympathy and Support for Islamic Terrorism: A Look at the Muslim Opinions on Al Qaeda and IS". ICCT Research Paper.