Rhodesia's Unilateral Declaration of Independence

Background

The southern African territory of Rhodesia, officially Southern Rhodesia,{{#tag:ref|Renamed Zimbabwe in 1980.{{Harvnb |Wessels |2010 |Rowland |1978 |Rowland |1978 |Wood |2005

Whitehall's powers over Southern Rhodesia under the 1923 constitution were, on paper, considerable; the British Crown was theoretically able to cancel any passed bill within a year, or alter the constitution however it wished. These reserved powers were intended to protect the indigenous black Africans from discriminatory legislation and to safeguard British commercial interests in the colony, but as Claire Palley comments in her constitutional history of the country, it would have been extremely difficult for Whitehall to enforce such actions, and attempting to do so would have probably caused a crisis.{{Harvnb |Palley |1966

The 1923 constitution was drawn up in non-racial terms, and the electoral system it devised was similarly open, at least in theory. Voting qualifications regarding personal income, education and property, similar to those of the Cape Qualified Franchise, were applied equally to all, but since most blacks did not meet the set standards, both the electoral roll and the colonial parliament were overwhelmingly from the white minority of about 5%. The result was that black interests were sparsely represented if at all, something that most of the colony's whites showed little interest in changing; they claimed that most blacks were uninterested in Western-style political process and that they would not govern properly if they took over.{{Harvnb |Weinrich |1973 |Gowlland-Debbas |1990 |Duignan |Jackson |1986 |Kavalski |Zolkos |2008 |Gastil |1980

In the wider Imperial context, Southern Rhodesia occupied a category unto itself because of the "special quasi-independent status" it held. The Dominions Office, formed in 1925 to handle British relations with the dominions of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Newfoundland, South Africa and the Irish Free State (the Statute of Westminster 1931 delineated the rights of the dominions more clearly in that year), also dealt with Southern Rhodesia, and Imperial Conferences included the Southern Rhodesian Prime Minister alongside those of the dominions from 1932.{{Harvnb |Saint Brides |1980}} This unique arrangement continued following the advent of Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conferences in 1944.{{Harvnb |Berlyn |1978 |Smith |1997

Federation and the Wind of Change

Believing full dominion status to be effectively symbolic and "there for the asking", Prime Minister Godfrey Huggins (in office from 1933 to 1953) twice ignored British overtures hinting at dominionship, and instead pursued an initially semi-independent Federation with Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, two colonies directly administered from London.{{Harvnb |Wood |2005 |Blake |1977 |Wood |2005 |Smith |1997 |Wood |2005

Coming at the start of the decolonisation period, the federation of self-governing Southern Rhodesia with two directly ruled British protectorates was later described by the British historian Robert Blake as "an aberration of history—a curious deviation from the inevitable course of events".{{Harvnb |Wood |2005 |Blake |1977 |Welensky |1964 |Jackson |1990 |Wood |2005 |Wood |2008

Attempting to advance the case for Southern Rhodesian independence, particularly in the event of Federal dissolution,{{Harvnb |Wood |2005 |Rowland |1978 |Wood |2005 |Wood |2005 |Wood |2005 |Wood |2005

The black Rhodesian movement in Southern Rhodesia, founded and organised by urban black elites during the late 1950s,{{Harvnb |West |2002 |Wood |2005 |Wood |2005 |Fontein |2006 |Ndlovu-Gatsheni |2009 |Wood |2005 |Wood |2005 |Cilliers |1984 |Martin |Johnson |1981 |Ranger |1997 |Wessels |2010 |Wood |2005 |Wood |2005 |Rowe |2001 |Wood |2005 |Wood |2005

Federal dissolution; the roots of mistrust

Meanwhile, secessionist black Rhodesian parties won electoral victories in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, and Harold Macmillan's Conservative administration in Britain moved towards breaking up the Federation, resolving that it had become untenable. In February 1962, the British Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, Duncan Sandys, secretly informed the Nyasaland nationalist leader Hastings Banda that secession would be allowed. A few days later, he horrified Welensky by telling him that "we British have lost the will to govern".{{Harvnb |Schwarz |2011 |Wood |2005 |Meredith |1984 |Wood |2005 |Schwarz |2011

As Southern Rhodesia had been the UK's legislative partner in forming the Federation in 1953, it would be impossible (or at least very difficult) for Britain to dissolve the union without Southern Rhodesia's co-operation. Field could therefore potentially hamstring the British by refusing to attend the conference until they pledged to grant his country full independence.{{Harvnb |Wood |2005 |Wood |2005 |Berlyn |1978 |Smith |1997 |Wood |2005 |Wood |2005

Field's government was startled by Britain's announcement in October 1963 that Nyasaland would become fully independent on 6 July 1964. While no date was set for Northern Rhodesian statehood, it was generally surmised that it was going to follow shortly thereafter. Smith was promptly sent to London, where he held a round of inconclusive Southern Rhodesian independence talks with the new British Prime Minister, Sir Alec Douglas-Home.{{#tag:ref|Douglas-Home was only a few days into his premiership following Macmillan's resignation on grounds of ill health. At one point during the meeting on 31 October 1964 he told Smith that though he opposed unilateral action, he felt Southern Rhodesia could "declare herself independent, [and] would be within her rights to do so". Scandalised, British civil servants withheld record of this comment from their Southern Rhodesian counterparts.{{Harvnb |Wood |2005

Positions and motivations

British government stance

The British government's refusal to grant independence to Southern Rhodesia under the 1961 constitution was largely the result of the geopolitical and moral shifts associated with the Wind of Change, coupled with the UK's wish to avoid opprobrium and loss of prestige in the United Nations (UN) and the Commonwealth. The issue gained international attention in Africa and worldwide as a flashpoint for questions of decolonisation and racism.{{Harvnb |Nyamunda |2016 |Fedorowich |Thomas |2001 |Nelson |1983

In the Commonwealth context, too, Britain knew that simply granting independence to Southern Rhodesia was out of the question as many of the Afro-Asian countries were also Commonwealth members. Statehood for Salisbury without majority rule would split the Commonwealth and perhaps cause it to break up, a disastrous prospect for British foreign policy. The Commonwealth repeatedly called on Britain to intervene directly should Southern Rhodesian defiance continue,{{Harvnb |Wood |2005 |Cunningham |1966 |McWilliam |2003}}

At party level, the Labour Party, in opposition until October 1964, was overtly against Southern Rhodesian independence under the 1961 constitution and supportive of the black Rhodesian movement on ideological and moral grounds. The Liberal Party, holding a handful of parliament seats, took a similar stance. The Conservative Party, while also following a policy of decolonisation, was more sympathetic to the Southern Rhodesian government's position, and included members who openly supported it.{{Harvnb |Wood |2005 |Morgan |1975

Southern Rhodesian government view

The Southern Rhodesian government found it bizarre that Britain was making independent states out of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, which the Rhodesians considered to be less developed territories with little experience of self-rule, while withholding sovereign statehood from Southern Rhodesia, the Federation's senior partner, which had already been self-governing for four decades and which was one of the most prosperous and developed countries in Africa. The principle of majority rule, the basis for this apparent inconsistency, was considered irrelevant by the Southern Rhodesians.{{Harvnb |Olson |Shadle |1996 |Wood |2005 |Di Perna |1978 |Wood |2005 |Olson |Shadle |1996 |Moorcraft |1990}}; {{Harvnb |Wood |2005 |Di Perna |1978

The RF claimed that the bloody civil wars, military coups and other disasters that plagued the new majority-ruled African states to the north, many of which had become corrupt, autocratic or communist one-party states very soon after independence,{{Harvnb |Mazrui |1993 |Petter-Bowyer |2005 |Schwarz |2011 |Wood |2005 |Wood |2005 |Moorcraft |1990}} and expressed a wish in the Cold War context to form an anti-communist, pro-Western front in Africa alongside South Africa and Portugal.{{Harvnb |Olson |Shadle |1996

These factors combined with what RF politicians and supporters saw as British decadence, chicanery and betrayal to create the case they put forward that UDI, while dubious legally and likely to provoke international uproar, might nevertheless be in their eyes justifiable and necessary for the good of the country and region if an accommodation could not be found with Whitehall.

Road to UDI

First steps, under Field

Field's failure to secure independence concurrently with the end of the Federation caused his Cabinet's support for him to waver during late 1963 and early 1964.{{Harvnb |Wood |2005 |Wood |2005 |Wood |2005

The RF united behind Field after Sandys wrote him a terse letter warning him of the likely Commonwealth reaction to a declaration of independence, but the Prime Minister then lost his party's confidence by failing to pursue a possible route to at least de facto independence devised by Desmond Lardner-Burke, a lawyer and RF MP for Gwelo. During March 1964, the Legislative Assembly in Salisbury considered and passed Lardner-Burke's motion that the Governor, Sir Humphrey Gibbs, should submit a petition to the Queen requesting alteration of Section 111 of the 1961 constitution so that the Royal Assent described therein would be exercised at the request of the Southern Rhodesian government rather than that of its British counterpart. This would both remove the possibility of British legislative interference and pave the way for an attempted assumption of independence by Order in Council.{{#tag:ref|The Lardner-Burke bill proposed that a two-thirds majority in the Legislative Assembly would prompt automatic consent for alterations from the Governor, who would then sign them into law on behalf of the Queen.{{Harvnb |Wood |2005

The RF's intention was partly to test whether or not the British would attempt to block this bill after Gibbs had granted Royal Assent to it,{{Harvnb |Smith |1997 |Young |1969 |Wood |2005

Smith replaces Field; talks with Douglas-Home

Smith, a farmer from the Midlands town of Selukwe who had been seriously wounded while serving in the British Royal Air Force during the Second World War, was Southern Rhodesia's first native-born Prime Minister.{{#tag:ref|Roy Welensky, who held the Federal premiership from 1956 to dissolution in 1963, was also born in Southern Rhodesia. Before Smith, Southern Rhodesia had had seven Prime Ministers, three of whom (including Field) had been born in Britain. The country's first two Prime Ministers, Charles Coghlan (1923–27) and Howard Moffat (1927–33), were respectively born in South Africa and Bechuanaland,{{Harvnb |Baxter |Burke |1970 |Wood |2005 |Schwarz |2011 |Berlyn |1978 |Caute |1983 |Wessels |2010 |Wilson |1974 |Wood |2005 |Hall |1966 |Hall |1966 |Hall |1966

Salisbury's blunt refusal to be part of the Wind of Change caused the Southern Rhodesian military's traditional British and American suppliers to impose an informal embargo, and prompted Whitehall and Washington to stop sending Southern Rhodesia financial aid around the same time. In June 1964, Douglas-Home informed Smith that Southern Rhodesia would not be represented at the year's Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference, despite Salisbury's record of attendance going back to 1932, because of a change in policy to only include representatives from fully independent states. This decision, taken by Britain to preempt the possibility of open confrontation with Asian and black African leaders at the conference, deeply insulted Smith.{{Harvnb |Wood |2005 |Berlyn |1978 |Welensky |1965}}

At 10 Downing Street in early September 1964, impasse developed between Douglas-Home and Smith over the best way to measure black public opinion in Southern Rhodesia. A key plank of Britain's Southern Rhodesia policy was that the terms for independence had to be "acceptable to the people of the country as a whole"—agreeing to this, Smith suggested that white and urban black opinion could be gauged through a general referendum of registered voters, and that rural black views could be obtained at a national indaba (tribal conference) of chiefs and headmen. Douglas-Home told Smith that although this proposal satisfied him personally, he could not accept it as he did not believe the Commonwealth, the United Nations or the Labour Party would also do so. He stressed that such a move towards accommodation with Smith might hurt the Conservatives' chances in the British general election the next month, and suggested that it might be in Smith's best interests to wait until after the election to continue negotiations. Smith accepted this argument. Douglas-Home assured Smith that a Conservative government would settle with him and grant independence within a year.{{Harvnb |Wood |2005

Attempting to form a viable white opposition to the Rhodesian Front, the UFP resurrected itself around Welensky, renamed itself the Rhodesia Party, and entered the Arundel and Avondale by-elections that had been called for 1 October 1964. Perturbed by the prospect of having to face the political heavyweight Welensky in parliament at the head of the opposition, the RF poured huge resources into winning both of these former UFP safe seats, and fielded Clifford Dupont, Smith's deputy, against Welensky in Arundel.{{#tag:ref|During the bitterly fought campaign,{{Harvnb |Wood |2005 |Windrich |1978 |Blake |1977 |White |1978 |Berlyn |1978

Wilson's Labour government; Salisbury's tests of opinion

Labour defeated the Conservatives by four seats in the British general election on 15 October 1964, and formed a government the next day. Both Labour and the Conservatives told Smith that a positive result at the indaba would not be recognised by Britain as representative of the people, and the Conservatives turned down Salisbury's invitation to send observers. Smith pressed on, telling parliament that he would ask the tribal chiefs and headmen "to consult their people in the traditional manner", then hold the indaba as planned.{{Harvnb |Wood |2005 |Wood |2005

While the chiefs conferred, Northern Rhodesia became independent Zambia on 24 October 1964, emulating Nyasaland, which had achieved statehood as Malawi three months earlier. Reasoning that it was no longer necessary to refer to itself as "Southern" in the absence of a northern counterpart, Southern Rhodesia began calling itself simply Rhodesia.{{#tag:ref|Salisbury passed legislation to shorten the name, but Britain ruled this ultra vires as the laws naming the country were British acts passed at Westminster. Salisbury went on using the shortened name in an official manner anyway,{{Harvnb |Palley |1966 |Rowland |1978

When the indaba ended on 26 October, the chiefs and headmen returned a unanimous decision to support the government's stand for independence under the 1961 constitution, attesting in their report that "people who live far away do not understand the problems of our country".{{Harvnb |Wood |2005 |Wood |2005 |Wood |2005 |Blake |1977 |Wilson |1974 |Wood |2005 |Wood |2005

Stalemate develops between Smith and Wilson

Smith wrote to Wilson the day after the referendum, asking him to send Bottomley to Salisbury for talks. Wilson replied that Smith should instead come to London. The British and Rhodesians exchanged often confrontational letters for the next few months. Alluding to the British financial aid pledged to Salisbury as part of the Federal dissolution arrangements, Wilson's High Commissioner in Salisbury, J B Johnston, wrote to the Rhodesian Cabinet Secretary Gerald B. Clarke on 23 December that "talk of a unilateral declaration of independence is bound to throw a shadow of uncertainty on the future financial relations between the two governments".{{Harvnb |Wood |2005 |Smith |1997

The two premiers were brought together in person in late January 1965, when Smith travelled to London for Sir Winston Churchill's funeral. Following an episode concerning Smith's non-invitation to a luncheon at Buckingham Palace after the funeral—noticing the Rhodesian's absence, the Queen sent a royal equerry to Smith's hotel to retrieve him, reportedly causing Wilson much irritation—the two prime ministers inconclusively debated at 10 Downing Street. They differed on most matters, but agreed on a visit to Rhodesia the next month by Bottomley and the Lord Chancellor, Lord Gardiner, to gauge public opinion and meet political and commercial figures.{{Harvnb |Wood |2005 |Wood |2005

The RF called a new general election for May 1965 and, campaigning on an election promise of independence, won all 50 "A"-roll seats (the voters for which were mostly white).{{#tag:ref|The electoral system devised in the 1961 constitution replaced the common voters' roll with two rolls, the "A" roll and the "B" roll, the latter of which had lower qualifications intended to make it easier for prospective voters to enter the political system. There were 50 "A"-roll constituencies and 15 larger "B"-roll districts, with a complicated mechanism of "cross-voting" allowing "B"-roll voters to slightly influence "A"-roll elections and vice versa. This system was theoretically non-racial, but in practice the "A" roll was largely white and the "B" roll was almost all black.{{Harvnb |Palley |1966 |Wood |2005 |Fedorowich |Thomas |2001 |Wood |2005 |Wood |2005 |Smith |1997 |Wood |2008

Final steps to UDI

|Wilson|We are not giving up. Too much is at stake ... I know I speak for everyone in these islands, all parties, all our people, when I say to Mr Smith, 'Prime Minister, think again'.|Smith|After 43 years of proving our case we are told that we cannot be master in our own house. Is it not incredible that the British government has allowed our case to deteriorate into this fantastic position? ... I believe I should say to Mr Wilson: 'Prime Minister, think again!'}}|source=-- Wilson and Smith called on each other through televised statements to "think again" on 13 October 1965{{Harvnb |Wood |2005

Amid renewed rumours of an impending Rhodesian UDI, Smith travelled to meet Wilson in London at the start of October 1965, telling the press that he intended to resolve the independence issue once and for all.{{Harvnb |Wood |2005 |Wood |2005 |Wood |2005

During these discussions, Smith referred to the last resort of a UDI on many occasions, though he said he hoped to find another way out of the quandary. He offered to increase black legislative representation by expanding the electorate along the lines of "one taxpayer, one vote"—which would enfranchise about half a million, but still leave most of the nation voteless—in return for a grant of independence.{{Harvnb |Wood |2005 |Wood |2005 |Wood |2005 |Wood |2005

Stalemate drew closer as the Rhodesian Cabinet resolved that since Wilson had ruled out maintenance of the status quo, its only remaining options were to trust in the Royal Commission or declare independence.{{Harvnb |Wood |2005 |Smith |1997 |Young |1969

Amid frantic efforts by Beadle and others on both sides to revive the Royal Commission, the Rhodesian government had Gibbs announce a state of emergency the same day on the grounds that black Rhodesian insurgents were reportedly entering the country. Smith denied that this foreshadowed a declaration of independence,{{Harvnb |Wood |2005 |Wood |2005

Draft, adoption and signing

The Rhodesian Minister for Justice and Law and Order, Desmond Lardner-Burke, presented the rest of the Cabinet with a draft for the declaration of independence on 5 November 1965. When Jack Howman, Minister of Tourism and Information, said that he was also preparing a draft, the Cabinet decided to wait to see his version too. The ministers agreed that if an independence proclamation were issued, they would all sign it. On 9 November, the Cabinet jointly devised an outline for the proclamation document and the accompanying statement to be made by Smith.{{Harvnb |Wood |2005 |Smith |1997 |St. Petersburg Times |1965}}—but no reference was made to the assertion that "all men are created equal", nor to the "consent of the governed", two omissions later stressed by a number of commentators.{{Harvnb |Hillier |1998 |Palley |1966 |Gowlland-Debbas |1990

Attached to the declaration of independence was a copy of the 1961 constitution amended for the circumstances, which became the 1965 constitution. In the eyes of the Smith administration, this document removed Whitehall's remaining authority over Rhodesia and made Rhodesia a de jure independent state. However, the Smith government still professed loyalty to Elizabeth II, and accordingly the document reconstituted Rhodesia as a Commonwealth realm with Elizabeth as "Queen of Rhodesia". The new constitution created the concept of allegiance to the "Constitution of Rhodesia", and introduced the post of Officer Administering the Government, a viceregal figure empowered to sign passed legislation into law on behalf of the monarch if she did not appoint a Governor-General.

The Rhodesian Cabinet waited in vain for Wilson's reply for the rest of 9 November and the next day. After briefly meeting Smith late on 10 November,{{Harvnb |Wood |2005 |Wood |2005

At 11:00 local time on 11 November 1965, Armistice Day, during the traditional two minutes' silence to remember the fallen of the two World Wars, Smith declared Rhodesia independent and signed the proclamation document, with Dupont and the other 10 ministers of the Cabinet following. The timing was intended to emphasise the sacrifices Rhodesia had made for Britain in wartime.{{Harvnb |McLaughlin |1980 |Wood |2005 |Wood |2005 |White |1978

Text of the declaration

Whereas in the course of human affairs history has shown that it may become necessary for a people to resolve the political affiliations which have connected them with another people and to assume amongst other nations the separate and equal status to which they are entitled:

And Whereas in such event a respect for the opinions of mankind requires them to declare to other nations the causes which impel them to assume full responsibility for their own affairs:

Now Therefore, We, The Government of Rhodesia, Do Hereby Declare:

That it is an indisputable and accepted historic fact that since 1923 the Government of Rhodesia have exercised the powers of self-government and have been responsible for the progress, development and welfare of their people;

That the people of Rhodesia having demonstrated their loyalty to the Crown and to their kith and kin in the United Kingdom and elsewhere through two world wars, and having been prepared to shed their blood and give of their substance in what they believed to be the mutual interests of freedom-loving people, now see all that they have cherished about to be shattered on the rocks of expediency;

That the people of Rhodesia have witnessed a process which is destructive of those very precepts upon which civilization in a primitive country has been built, they have seen the principles of Western democracy, responsible government and moral standards crumble elsewhere, nevertheless they have remained steadfast;

That the people of Rhodesia fully support the requests of their government for sovereign independence but have witnessed the consistent refusal of the Government of the United Kingdom to accede to their entreaties;

That the Government of the United Kingdom have thus demonstrated that they are not prepared to grant sovereign independence to Rhodesia on terms acceptable to the people of Rhodesia, thereby persisting in maintaining an unwarrantable jurisdiction over Rhodesia, obstructing laws and treaties with other states and the conduct of affairs with other nations and refusing assent to laws necessary for the public good, all this to the detriment of the future peace, prosperity and good government of Rhodesia;

That the Government of Rhodesia have for a long period patiently and in good faith negotiated with the Government of the United Kingdom for the removal of the remaining limitations placed upon them and for the grant of sovereign independence;

That in the belief that procrastination and delay strike at and injure the very life of the nation, the Government of Rhodesia consider it essential that Rhodesia should attain, without delay, sovereign independence, the justice of which is beyond question;

Now Therefore, We The Government of Rhodesia, in humble submission to Almighty God who controls the destinies of nations, conscious that the people of Rhodesia have always shown unswerving loyalty and devotion to Her Majesty the Queen and earnestly praying that we and the people of Rhodesia will not be hindered in our determination to continue exercising our undoubted right to demonstrate the same loyalty and devotion, and seeking to promote the common good so that the dignity and freedom of all men may be assured, Do, By This Proclamation, adopt, enact and give to the people of Rhodesia the Constitution annexed hereto;

Given under Our Hand at Salisbury, this eleventh day of November in the Year of Our Lord one thousand nine hundred and sixty-five.

• Prime Minister: Ian Smith
• Deputy Prime Minister: Clifford Dupont
• Ministers: William Harper, Montrose, Phillip van Heerden, Jack Howman, Jack Mussett, John Wrathall, Desmond Lardner-Burke, George Rudland, Ian McLean, Arthur Philip Smith |}}

Announcement and reactions

Announcement

Prompted by the government, the Rhodesian Broadcasting Corporation told the public to stand by for an important announcement from the Prime Minister at 13:15 local time. Smith went first to Government House to inform Gibbs that his Cabinet had declared independence, then to Pockets Hill Studios in east Salisbury to announce UDI to the nation. He read the proclamation aloud, then stated that independence had been declared because it had become "abundantly clear that it is the policy of the British government to play us along with no real intention of arriving at a solution which we could possibly accept ... I promised the people of this country that I would continue to negotiate to the bitter end and that I would leave no stone unturned in my endeavours to secure an honourable and mutually accepted settlement; it now falls to me to tell you that negotiations have come to an end".{{Harvnb |Wood |2005

Smith said that he believed that he would be remiss in his duty if he allowed Rhodesia to continue to "drift in its present paralysing state of uncertainty", and that following Britain's abandonment of the Federation his government was determined that "the same will never be allowed to happen here". He claimed that UDI did not mark "a diminution in the opportunities which our African people have to advance and prosper in Rhodesia", described "racial harmony in Africa" as part of his agenda and condemned black Rhodesian activities as attempts to "blackmail the British government into ... handing the country over to irresponsible rule". He then attempted to assuage fears that economic sanctions might destroy the economy, and asked Rhodesians to stand firm: "The mantle of the pioneers has fallen on our shoulders ... In the lives of most nations there comes a moment when a stand has to be made for principles, whatever the consequences. This moment has come to Rhodesia ... the first Western nation in the last two decades to say 'so far and no further'." He concluded with an assertion that the declaration of independence was "a blow for the preservation of justice, civilisation and Christianity".{{Harvnb |Wood |2005

Domestic reactions

By the time Smith and Dupont arrived at Government House to see Gibbs, Whitehall had instructed the Governor to formally dismiss Smith and his ministers for treason. Gibbs complied without hesitation. Smith and his ministers ignored this, holding that under the new 1965 constitution Gibbs "no longer ha[d] any executive powers in Rhodesia", and his reserve power to sack them no longer existed.{{Harvnb |Peterson |1971 |Wood |2008 |Wood |1999}} "Not likely", Wilson retorted.

The Rhodesian government accompanied UDI with emergency measures that it said were intended to prevent alarm, unrest and the flight of people and capital. Press censorship and petrol rationing were imposed, import licences were cancelled and emigration allowances were cut to £100. News of UDI was generally received calmly by the local citizenry, apart from some isolated incidents of passing cars being stoned in the black townships outside Bulawayo. A few expected dissenters were arrested, most prominently Leo Baron, Nkomo's lawyer, whose links with black Rhodesians and communists were seen by authorities as "subversive". Baron, the younger brother of the scientist Jacob Bronowski, was arrested nine minutes after UDI was made.

|Berlyn |1967

Welensky, who had opposed UDI, stated that he felt it was nevertheless "the duty of every responsible Rhodesian to support the revolutionary government" as he believed the only alternative was a descent into anarchy. , the Portuguese consul-general in Salisbury, reacted to the news with wild excitement; visiting the Smith residence later in the day, he declared "Only Rhodesians could do this!" A statement from ZAPU's Jason Moyo, who was in London at the time, denounced UDI as an act of "treason and rebellion" and asserted that "the lives particularly of four million unarmed Africans are in jeopardy".{{Harvnb |BBC |1965}} Davis M'Gabe of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) said that "For all those who cherish freedom and a meaningful life, UDI has set a collision course which cannot be altered. [It has] marked the turning point of the struggle for freedom ... from a constitutional and political one to primarily a military struggle."{{Harvnb |Davidson |Slovo |Wilkinson |1976 |Peaden |1979

A week after UDI, Smith's government announced that Dupont, the Deputy Prime Minister, had resigned from the Cabinet to accept the post of Officer Administering the Government created by the 1965 constitution. Attempting to assert his claimed prerogatives as Her Majesty's Rhodesian Prime Minister, Smith advised the Queen by letter to appoint Dupont as Governor-General to supersede Gibbs. The letter was ignored, with Buckingham Palace characterising Smith's request as "purported advice".{{Harvnb |Young |1969

The Speaker of the Rhodesian parliament, A. R. W. Stumbles, reconvened the Legislative Assembly on 25 November, resolving that if he did not there would be chaos. He feared that Gibbs might dramatically walk into the chamber in an attempt to stop the proceedings, but Gibbs did no such thing. The parliamentary opposition opened the meeting by asking whether the assembly was legal. Ahrn Palley, the lone white opposition MP, announced that as he saw it, "certain Honourable Members in collusion have torn up the constitution under which this House meets. The proceedings have no legal validity whatsoever". Stumbles overruled this objection and two more interruptions from Palley, and suggested that any members with reservations might leave. Palley continued his loud protests until he was forcibly ejected by the Sergeant-at-Arms, shouting "This is an illegal assembly! God save the Queen!"{{Harvnb |Time |1965}} Gondo and eight other opposition MPs followed Palley out;{{Harvnb |Wood |2008 |Wood |2008

Gibbs received threatening letters from the Rhodesian public, and on 26 November 1965 Smith's government cut off the telephones at Government House, and removed the ceremonial guard, the official cars "and even the typewriters", Wood records. Gibbs nevertheless refused to step down or to leave Government House, issuing a statement that he would remain there "as the lawful Governor of Rhodesia until such time as constitutional government is restored, which I hope will be soon." He stayed at his post, ignored by the post-UDI government, until the declaration of a republic in 1970.

British and international responses; sanctions

Wilson was astonished by Smith's actions, and found the timing of the declaration to coincide with the Armistice Day silence deeply insulting. Describing Salisbury as "hell-bent on illegal self-destroying", the British prime minister, supported in the Commons by the Liberals and most Conservatives, called on Rhodesians to ignore the post-UDI government. Within hours of UDI, the UN General Assembly passed a condemnatory resolution, 107–2—South Africa and Portugal voted against, and France abstained—decrying Rhodesia's actions and calling on Britain to end "the rebellion by the unlawful authorities in Salisbury".{{Harvnb |Wood |2008 |Gowlland-Debbas |1990

Rhodesian nationalists and their overseas supporters, prominently the OAU, clamoured for Britain to remove Smith's government by force. The UN Committee on Independence also strongly advised military intervention. The British government dismissed this option because of various logistical issues, the risk of provoking a Rhodesian attack on Zambia and the psychological problems that were likely to accompany any confrontation between British and Rhodesian troops in what Smith said would be a "fratricidal war". British Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart stated that the United Kingdom thought that Rhodesian forces were well-equipped, well-trained and highly motivated and that an invasion would lead to "a medium sized war of uncertain duration". Wilson instead resolved to end the Rhodesian rebellion through economic sanctions; these principally comprised the expulsion of Rhodesia from the Sterling area, a ban on the import of Rhodesian sugar, tobacco, chrome and other goods and an oil boycott of Rhodesia. When the Rhodesians continued to receive oil, Wilson attempted to directly cut off their main supply lines, namely the Portuguese Mozambican ports at Beira and Lourenço Marques, by posting a Royal Navy squadron to the Mozambique Channel in March 1966. This blockade, the Beira Patrol, was endorsed the following month by UN Security Council Resolution 221.{{Harvnb |Mobley |2002

Wilson predicted in January 1966 that the various boycotts would force Smith to give in "within a matter of weeks rather than months", but the British and UN sanctions had little effect on Rhodesia, largely because South Africa and Portugal went on trading with the breakaway colony, providing it with oil and other commodities. Clandestine "sanction-busting" trade with other nations also continued, initially at a reduced level and the diminished presence of foreign competitors helped domestic industries to slowly mature and expand. Rhodesia thus avoided the economic collapse predicted by Wilson and gradually became more self-sufficient. The Rhodesian government set up a string of front holding companies in Switzerland, Luxembourg and Liechtenstein to help keep trade open with some success; goods that had been imported from Britain were replaced by Japanese, French and West German equivalents. Even many OAU states, while bombarding Rhodesia with vitriol, continued importing Rhodesian food and other products. The United States created a formal exception in its embargo with the Byrd Amendment of 1971, under which the US replaced its import of chrome from the Soviet Union with Rhodesian chrome ore. This breach of the UN sanctions, passed by the US Congress on the back of anti-communist Cold War considerations, was warmly welcomed by several white Southerners in Congress; it aided the Rhodesian economy until 1977, when the new president, Jimmy Carter, successfully pushed Congress to repeal it.

Recognition

Foreign

Official diplomatic recognition by other countries was key for Rhodesia as it was the only way it could regain the international legitimacy it had lost through UDI. Recognition by the UK itself through a bilateral settlement would be the "first prize", in Smith's words, as it would end sanctions and constitutional ambiguity and make foreign acceptance, at least in the West, far more likely.{{Harvnb |Windrich |1978 |Borstelmann |2003 |White |2010 |Nel |McGowan |1999 |Glasgow Herald |1967}}

Britain withdrew most of its High Commission staff from Salisbury in the days following UDI, leaving a small skeleton staff to man a "residual mission" intended to help Gibbs keep the British government informed of local happenings.{{Harvnb |Berlyn |1978 |Strack |1978 |Brownell |2010}}

Because UDI claimed to make Rhodesia independent under the Queen as an effective dominion, many countries justified their retention of missions in Rhodesia concurrently with their non-recognition of the state by pointing out that the envoys' accreditation was to the Queen and not to Smith's government per se. But Rhodesia moved away from its original line of independence as a constitutional monarchy and towards republicanism during the late 1960s, hoping to end ambiguity regarding its claimed constitutional status and elicit official foreign recognition. In March 1970, after the electorate had voted "yes" in a referendum the previous year both to a new constitution and to the abandoning of symbolic ties to the Queen, Smith's government declared Rhodesia a republic. Far from prompting recognition, this led all countries apart from Portugal and South Africa to withdraw their consulates and missions, as the justification of royal accreditation could no longer be used. After Portugal's Carnation Revolution in 1974, the Rhodesian mission in Lisbon was closed in May 1975, with its counterpart in Lourenço Marques following a month later on Mozambican independence. Portugal also withdrew its own remaining officials from Rhodesia, leaving South Africa as the only country with links to Salisbury. Rhodesia's diplomatic activities were thereafter greatly diminished.{{Harvnb |Strack |1978

Judicial

The Rhodesian High Court's nine Appellate and General Division judges initially neither rejected UDI nor openly supported it. The Chief Justice Sir Hugh Beadle, of the Appellate Division, announced simply that the judges would go on carrying out their duties "according to the law". This originally noncommittal stance evolved over time, largely pivoting around legal cases argued at the High Court in Salisbury between 1966 and 1968. The first of these, Madzimbamuto v. Lardner-Burke N. O. and Others, concerned Daniel Madzimbamuto, a black Rhodesian who was detained without trial by the Rhodesian government on 6 November 1965, the day after the declaration of a state of emergency and five days before UDI, on the grounds that he might pose a danger to the public. Desmond Lardner-Burke, the Rhodesian Minister of Justice and Law and Order, prolonged the state of emergency in February 1966, prompting Madzimbamuto's wife to appeal for his release, arguing that since the United Kingdom had declared UDI illegal and outlawed the Rhodesian government with the Southern Rhodesia Act 1965, the state of emergency (and, by extension, Madzimbamuto's imprisonment) had no legal basis.

The General Division of the Rhodesian High Court ruled on 9 September 1966 that legal sovereignty lay with the British government, but that to "avoid chaos and a vacuum in the law" the Rhodesian government should be considered to be in control of law and order to the same extent as before UDI. In February 1968, ruling on Madzimbamuto's appeal, Beadle concluded that the Smith administration would be recognised by the local judiciary as the de facto government by virtue of its "effective control over the state's territory", but that de jure recognition would be withheld as this was not "firmly established".{{Harvnb |Gowlland-Debbas |1990 |Wood |2008 |Wood |2008

In late February 1968, considering the fate of James Dhlamini, Victor Mlambo and Duly Shadreck, three black Rhodesians convicted of murder and terrorist offences before UDI, Beadle ruled that Salisbury retained its pre-UDI powers regarding executions and could carry out death sentences. Whitehall announced on 1 March that at the request of the UK government, the Queen had exercised the royal prerogative of mercy and commuted the three death sentences to life imprisonment. Dhlamini and the others applied for a permanent stay of execution on this basis. At the hearing for Dhlamini and Mlambo on 4 March 1968, Beadle argued that he saw the statement from London as a decision by the UK government and not the Queen herself, and that in any case the 1961 constitution had transferred the prerogative of mercy from Britain to the Rhodesian Executive Council. "The present government is the fully de facto government and as such is the only power that can exercise the prerogative", he concluded. "It would be strange indeed if the United Kingdom government, exercising no internal power in Rhodesia, were given the right to exercise the prerogative of clemency."{{Harvnb |Wood |2008

On 23 July 1968, the Privy Council in London ruled in Madzimbamuto's favour, deciding that orders for detention made by the Rhodesian government were invalid regardless of whether the 1961 or 1965 constitution was considered effective. It declared the latter, "revolutionary" constitution illegal, and ruled that the former was overridden by the Southern Rhodesia Act 1965, which had effectively outlawed the Rhodesian legislative, administrative and legal authorities in British law. Lord Reid, delivering the majority opinion (Lord Pearce dissented), argued that the "usurper" government, though the effective master of Rhodesia, could not be considered lawful as the UK government was still attempting to regain control and it was impossible to say whether or not it would succeed. He ruled that only Whitehall could determine what constituted the maintenance of "law and order" in Rhodesia, and that the Rhodesian emergency measures were unlawful as they had been formalised by the Officer Administering the Government, a post-UDI figure who was, in British eyes, unconstitutional. Reid concluded that Madzimbamuto was illegally detained. Harry Davies, one of the Rhodesian judges, announced on 8 August that the Rhodesian courts would not consider this ruling binding as they no longer accepted the Privy Council as part of the Rhodesian judicial hierarchy. Justice J. R. Dendy Young resigned in protest at Davies' ruling on 12 August and four days later was sworn in as Chief Justice of Botswana.{{Harvnb |Wood |2008

The Rhodesian High Court granted full de jure recognition to the post-UDI government on 13 September 1968, while rejecting the appeals of 32 black Rhodesians who had been a month earlier convicted of terrorist offences and sentenced to death. Beadle declared that while he believed the Rhodesian judiciary should respect rulings of the Privy Council "so far as possible", the judgement of 23 July had made it legally impossible for Rhodesian judges to continue under the 1961 constitution. He asserted that the court therefore faced a choice between the 1965 constitution and a legal vacuum, the latter of which he felt he could not endorse.{{Harvnb |Wood |2008

Macdonald, a member of Beadle's ruling panel, argued that since UDI, the British government had acted unconstitutionally and illegally regarding Rhodesia by involving the United Nations in what should have been legally considered a domestic problem, and had concurrently abdicated its right to the allegiance of the Rhodesian people by waging economic war against the country and encouraging other nations to do the same. To support this argument, Macdonald referred to the assertion by the 17th-century Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius that "the purpose of governing and the purpose of destroying cannot subsist together". Since Britain was in a state of economic war against Rhodesia, the court concluded, it could not at the same time be regarded as governing it.{{Harvnb |Young |1969

The British Commonwealth Secretary, George Thomson, promptly accused the Rhodesian judges of breaching "the fundamental laws of the land", while Gibbs announced that since his position as Governor existed under the 1961 constitution, which allowed appeals to the Privy Council, he could only reject the Rhodesian court ruling. The Rhodesian judges continued regardless. Their recognition of the post-UDI order carried over to the 1969 republican constitution, adopted in 1970.

Replacement of national symbols

|Smith |1976 Vestiges of British ties were removed piecemeal by the government over the decade following UDI, and replaced with symbols and terminology intended to be more uniquely Rhodesian.{{Harvnb |Nyoka |1970}} A silver "Liberty Bell", based on the bell of the same name in Philadelphia, was cast during 1966 and rung by the Prime Minister 12 times each year on Independence Day (the anniversary of UDI), with some in the press erroneously believing the number of chimes signifying the number of years since the declaration of independence.{{Harvnb |Wood |2008 |Young |1969 |Schwarz |2011

Since Elizabeth II was still the Rhodesian head of state in the eyes of Smith's administration until 1970, "God Save the Queen" remained the Rhodesian national anthem, and continued to accompany official occasions such as the opening of the Rhodesian parliament. This was intended to demonstrate Rhodesia's continued loyalty to the Queen, but the use of the unmistakably British song at Rhodesian state occasions soon seemed "fairly ironic", as The Times put it.{{Harvnb |Buch |2004 |Vancouver Sun |1974}} and in 1974, after four years without an anthem ("God Save the Queen" was formally dropped in 1970), republican Rhodesia adopted "Rise, O Voices of Rhodesia", an anthem coupling original lyrics with the tune of Beethoven's "Ode to Joy".{{Harvnb |Buch |2004

State press censorship, which had been introduced on UDI, was lifted in early April 1968.{{Harvnb |Wood |2008 |Tanser |1975 |Petter-Bowyer |2005 |Saffery |2006

Ending UDI

Wilson told the British House of Commons in January 1966 that he would not enter any kind of dialogue with the post-UDI Rhodesian "illegal regime" until it gave up its claim of independence, but by mid-1966 British and Rhodesian civil servants were holding "talks about talks" in London and Salisbury. By November that year, Wilson had agreed to negotiate personally with Smith. The two Prime Ministers unsuccessfully attempted to settle aboard HMS Tiger in December 1966 and HMS Fearless in October 1968.

After the Conservatives returned to power in Britain in 1970, provisional agreement was reached in November 1971 between the Rhodesian government and a British team headed by Douglas-Home (who was Foreign Secretary under Prime Minister Edward Heath), and in early 1972 a Royal Commission chaired by Lord Pearce travelled to Rhodesia to investigate how acceptable the proposals were to majority opinion. After extensive consultation, the commission reported that while whites, coloureds and Asians were largely in favour of the presented terms, most blacks rejected them. The deal was therefore shelved by the British government.

The Rhodesian Bush War, a guerrilla conflict pitting the Rhodesian Security Forces against the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) and the Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA), the respective armed wings of ZANU and ZAPU, began in earnest in December 1972, when ZANLA attacked Altena and Whistlefield Farms in north-eastern Rhodesia. The 1974 Carnation Revolution in Portugal, which over the next year replaced Portuguese support for Smith with an independent, Marxist–Leninist Mozambique on Rhodesia's eastern frontier, greatly swung the war's momentum in favour of the nationalists (particularly ZANU, which was allied with Mozambique's governing FRELIMO party), and caused the sanctions on Rhodesia to finally begin having a noticeable effect. Diplomatic isolation, the sanctions, guerrilla activities and pressure from South Africa to find a settlement led the Rhodesian government to hold talks with the various black Rhodesian factions. Abortive conferences were held at Victoria Falls (in 1975) and Geneva (1976). Despite ideological and tribal rifts, ZANU and ZAPU nominally united as the "Patriotic Front" (PF) in late 1976 in a successful attempt to augment overseas support for the black Rhodesian cause.

By the mid-1970s, it was apparent that white minority rule could not continue forever. Even South Africa's prime minister John Vorster realized that white rule in a country where blacks outnumbered whites 22:1 was not a realistic option. Smith, who was decisively re-elected three times during the 1970s, eventually came to this conclusion as well. He announced his acceptance in principle of one man, one vote during Henry Kissinger's Anglo-American initiative in September 1976, and in March 1978 concluded the Internal Settlement with non-militant nationalist groups headed by Bishop Abel Muzorewa, the Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole and Chief Jeremiah Chirau. This settlement, boycotted by the PF and rejected internationally, led to multiracial elections and Rhodesia's reconstitution under majority rule as Zimbabwe Rhodesia in June 1979. Muzorewa, the electoral victor, took office as the country's first black prime minister at the head of a coalition cabinet comprising 12 blacks and five whites, including Smith as minister without portfolio. Dismissing Muzorewa as a "neocolonial puppet", ZANLA and ZIPRA continued their armed struggle until December 1979, when Whitehall, Salisbury and the Patriotic Front settled at Lancaster House. Muzorewa's government revoked UDI, thereby ending the country's claim to be independent after 14 years, and dissolved itself. The UK suspended the constitution and vested full executive and legislative powers in a new Governor, Lord Soames, who oversaw a ceasefire and fresh elections during February and March 1980. These were won by ZANU, whose leader Robert Mugabe became Prime Minister when the UK granted independence to Zimbabwe as a republic within the Commonwealth in April 1980. African nationalist politicians continued to cite their opposition to the UDI as a means of legitimising their rule of Zimbabwe into the 21st century. Since it was issued, the UDI has been recounted in scholarly literature, autobiographies of those involved in its creation, and works of fiction.

Notes

References

Footnotes

Speeches

• {{cite speech |author-link=Roy Welensky |access-date=5 June 2013

Newspaper and journal articles

• {{cite journal
• {{cite journal |author-link=George Cunningham (British politician)
• {{cite magazine |access-date=11 June 2013
• {{cite journal
• {{cite journal |url-status = dead |archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20140914110201/https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/5b9b2e96-200c-4d99-b8bb-0e3490488bfa/Beira-Patrol%2C-The--Britain-s-Broken-Blockade-again |archive-date = 14 September 2014
• {{cite journal |author-link=Paul Moorcraft |access-date=11 June 2013
• {{cite news |access-date=11 June 2013
• {{cite journal |access-date=4 July 2013
• {{cite journal |author-link=Terence Ranger
• {{cite journal |author-link=Morrice James, Baron Saint Brides
• {{cite journal |access-date=11 June 2013 |archive-date=11 January 2014 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140111201800/http://www.people.com/people/archive/article/0,,20073566,00.html |url-status=dead
• {{cite magazine |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121025202349/http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,842248-1,00.html |url-status=dead |archive-date=25 October 2012 |access-date=24 July 2013
• {{cite news |access-date=21 June 2013
• {{cite news |access-date=11 June 2013
• {{cite news |access-date=11 June 2013

Online sources

• {{cite web |access-date=10 June 2013
• {{cite web |access-date=4 July 2013

Bibliography

• {{cite book
• {{cite book
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• {{cite book
• {{cite book |author-link=Robert Blake, Baron Blake
• {{cite book
• {{cite book |orig-year=1999
• {{cite book |author-link=David Caute
• {{cite book
• {{cite book |author1-link=Basil Davidson |author2-link=Joe Slovo
• {{cite book |orig-year=1973
• {{cite book |editor1-last=Duignan |editor1-first=Peter |editor2-last=Jackson |editor2-first=Robert H.
• {{cite book |editor1-last=Fedorowich |editor1-first=Kent |editor2-last=Thomas |editor2-first=Martin
• {{cite book
• {{cite book |editor-last=Gastil |editor-first=Raymond |editor-link=Raymond Gastil |title-link=Freedom in the World
• {{cite book
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• {{cite book |editor1-last=Kavalski |editor1-first=Emilian |editor2-last=Zolkos |editor2-first=Magdalena
• {{cite book | editor-last = Kumarasingham | editor-first = H
• {{cite book
• {{cite book |editor-last=Mazrui |editor-first=Ali Al'Amin |editor-link=Ali Mazrui |url-access=registration
• {{cite book |url-access=registration |author-link=Martin Meredith
• {{cite book |author-link=Peter McLaughlin
• Michel, Eddie. The White House and White Africa: Presidential Policy Toward Rhodesia During the UDI Era, 1965-1979 (New York: Routledge, 2019). online review
• {{cite book |author-link1=Paul Moorcraft |author-link2=Peter McLaughlin |orig-year=1982
• {{cite book
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• {{cite book |editor1-last=Nel |editor1-first=Philip |editor2-last=McGowan |editor2-first=Pat
• {{cite book |editor-last=Nelson |editor-first=Harold D
• {{cite book |editor1-last=Olson |editor1-first=James Stuart |editor1-link=James S. Olson |editor2-last=Shadle |editor2-first=Robert
• {{cite book |author-link=Claire Palley
• {{cite book |editor-last=Peterson |editor-first=Robert W.
• {{cite book |orig-year=2003
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• {{cite book |author-link=Ian Smith |title-link=The Great Betrayal: The Memoirs of Ian Douglas Smith
• {{cite book |editor-last=Smith |editor-first=Whitney |editor-link=Whitney Smith
• {{cite book
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• {{cite book |author-link=Roy Welensky
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• {{cite news |editor1-last=Gordin |editor1-first=Michael D. |editor2-last=Tilley |editor2-first=Helen |editor3-last=Prakash |editor3-first=Gyan
• {{cite book
• {{cite book |author-link=Harold Wilson |orig-year=1971
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• {{cite book |orig-year=1967

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