People's Liberation Army Rocket Force

History

Second Artillery Corps

China established the Second Artillery as a branch of the PLA designed to operate its nuclear missiles. Top political leadership retained centralized control over the nuclear arsenal. In 1967, the CMC issued the Temporary Regulations on the Second Artillery's Basic Tasks and Command Relationships, which established a direct line of command to the nuclear missile units and specified that "force development, deployments, maneuvers, and especially its combat [operations] must all be under the collective leadership of the CMC; extremely strictly [and] extremely precisely, obeying and carrying out the orders of the CMC."

In the 1970s, the nuclear weapons program saw the development of MRBM, IRBM and ICBMs and marked the beginning of a deterrent force. China continued MRBM deployment, began deploying the Dongfeng-3 IRBM and successfully tested and commenced deployment of the Dongfeng-4 (CSS-4) limited-range ICBM.

In 1980, the CMC stated that the Second Artillery should operate under the principles of "close defense" to ensure survivability of the nuclear force and "key point counterstrikes" to carry out retaliation. In 1984, the Second Artillery added a third principle, reflecting Deng Xiaoping's preferences, that the nuclear force be "lean and effective". The Second Artillery made its first public appearance on 1 October 1984.

In the late 1980s, China was the world's third-largest nuclear power, possessing a small but credible nuclear deterrent force of approximately 100 to 400 nuclear weapons. Beginning in the late 1970s, China deployed a full range of nuclear weapons and acquired a nuclear second-strike capability. The nuclear forces were operated by the 100,000-person Strategic Missile Force, which was controlled directly by the General Staff.

China began developing nuclear weapons in the late 1950s with substantial Soviet assistance. With the Sino-Soviet split in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the Soviet Union withheld plans and data for an atomic bomb, abrogated the agreement on transferring defense and nuclear technology, and began the withdrawal of Soviet advisers in 1960. Despite the termination of Soviet assistance, China committed itself to continue nuclear weapons development to break "the superpowers' monopoly on nuclear weapons," to ensure Chinese security against the Soviet and American threats, and to increase Chinese prestige and power internationally.

China made rapid progress in the 1960s in developing nuclear weapons. In a 32-month period, China successfully tested its first atomic bomb on October 16, 1964, at Lop Nor, launched its first nuclear missile on October 27, 1966, and detonated its first hydrogen bomb on June 17, 1967. Deployment of the Dongfeng-1 conventionally armed short-range ballistic missile and the Dongfeng-2 (CSS-1) medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) occurred in the 1960s. The Dongfeng-3 (CCS-2) intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) was successfully tested in 1969. Although the Cultural Revolution disrupted the strategic weapons program less than other scientific and educational sectors in China, there was a slowdown in succeeding years.

Gansu hosted a missile launching area. China destroyed 9 U-2 surveillance craft while two went missing when they attempted to spy on it.

By 1980, China had overcome the slowdown in nuclear development caused by the Cultural Revolution and had successes in its strategic weapons program. In May 1980, China successfully test launched its full-range ICBM, the Dongfeng-5 (CCS-4); the missile flew from central China to the Western Pacific, where it was recovered by a naval task force. The Dongfeng-5 possessed the capability to hit targets in the Soviet Union and the western United States.

In 1981, China launched three satellites into space orbit from a single launch vehicle, indicating that China might possess the technology to develop multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs). China also launched the Type 092 submarine SSBN (Xia-class) in 1981, and the next year it conducted its first successful test launch of the Julang-2 submarine-launched ballistic missile (CSS-NX-4).

In addition to the development of a sea-based nuclear force, China began considering the development of tactical nuclear weapons. PLA exercises featured the simulated use of tactical nuclear weapons in offensive and defensive situations beginning in 1982. Reports of Chinese possession of tactical nuclear weapons had remained unconfirmed in 1987.

In 1986, China possessed a credible deterrent force with land, sea and air elements. Land-based forces included ICBMs, IRBMs, and MRBMs. The sea-based strategic force consisted of SSBNs. The Air Force's bombers were capable of delivering nuclear bombs but would be unlikely to penetrate the sophisticated air defenses of modern military powers.

During the 1999 NATO bombing of Yugoslavia, the United States bombed the Chinese embassy in Belgrade. Believing that the bombing was intentional, Chinese leadership worried that China was significantly lacking in leverage against the United States. Among the measures China took to close its lack in leverage were efforts to develop precision missiles and accelerating plans to expand conventional missile forces.

China's nuclear forces, in combination with the PLA's conventional forces, served to deter both nuclear and conventional attacks on the Chinese lands. Chinese leaders pledged to not use nuclear weapons first (no first use), but pledged to absolutely counter-attack with nuclear weapons if nuclear weapons are used against China. China envisioned retaliation against strategic and tactical attacks and would probably strike countervalue rather than counterforce targets.

The combination of China's few nuclear weapons and technological factors such as range, accuracy, and response time limited the effectiveness of nuclear strikes against counterforce targets. China has been seeking to increase the credibility of its nuclear retaliatory capability by dispersing and concealing its nuclear forces in difficult terrain, improving their mobility, and hardening its missile silos.

The CJ-10 long-range cruise missile made its first public appearance during the military parade on the 60th Anniversary of the People's Republic of China; the CJ-10 represents the next generation in rocket weapons technology in the PLA.

In late 2009, it was reported that the Corps was constructing a 3000 – long underground launch and storage facility for nuclear missiles in the Hebei province. 47 News reported that the facility was likely located in the Taihang Mountains.

The DF-ZF hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV) made its first flight test on 9 January 2014; it likely entered service by October 2019. It is believed to have atop speed of Mach 10, or 12,360 km/h.

Two Chinese technical papers from December 2012 and April 2013 show that China has concluded that hypersonic weapons pose "a new aerospace threat" and that they are developing satellite directed precision guidance systems. China is the third country to enter the "hypersonic arms race" after Russia and the United States. The U.S. Air Force has flown the X-51A Waverider technology demonstrator and the U.S. Army has flight tested the Advanced Hypersonic Weapon. China later confirmed the successful test flight of a "hypersonic missile delivery vehicle," but claimed it was part of a scientific experiment and not aimed at a target.

People's Liberation Army Rocket Force

The name was changed from the PLA Second Artillery Corps to the PLA Rocket Force on 1 January 2016. Despite claims by some, there appears to be no evidence to suggest that the new generation of Chinese ballistic-missile submarines came under PLARF control.

US Air Force National Air and Space Intelligence Center estimated that as of 2023 the number of Chinese nuclear warheads capable of reaching the United States has expanded well over 200.

In June 2021, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies has found out that China is constructing new missile silo field in Gansu in western China. According to the satellite picture, 119 missile silos for intercontinental ballistic missiles are under construction near Yumen City. In July, Federation Of American Scientists found out there are another 110 silos being built in Hami, Xinjiang. The two significant expansion projects include silos more than ten times the number of ICBM silos in operation of PLARF today.

In July 2021, China tested globe-circling hypersonic missile including the unprecedented launch of a separate 2nd missile from the ultra-high-speed vehicle according to the Financial Times and Wall Street Journal. The test showed China's development of its strategic, nuclear-capable weapons as more advanced than any had thought, surprising Pentagon officials, the two newspapers said. Neither the United States nor Russia has demonstrated the same ability, which requires launching a missile from a parent vehicle traveling five times the speed of sound. According to reporting by the Financial Times, this weapons system consists of two parts: a fractional orbital bombardment system (FOBS) and a hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV).

In July 2023, South China Morning Post reported that PLARF commander Li Yuchao and deputy commander Liu Guangbin were under the investigation by the CMC Commission for Discipline Inspection. Later that month, both Li Yuchao and Liu Guangbin were officially removed from their posts, while Wang Houbin was appointed as the commander of the PLARF. Additionally, Xu Xisheng was appointed as the political commissar. Li Yuchao and Liu Guangbin's expulsion has not been formally explained. There are rumors that they are being investigated for corruption or disclosing military secrets. Furthermore, it was thought to be an odd decision to replace the Rocket Force commander with military personnel from outside the branch, and this led to concerns about the security, credibility, and integrity of the PLA as well as its participation in China's military tactics during the Taiwan Strait conflict.

On 25 September 2024 at 00:44 UTC, the PLARF performed its first intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) test over the Pacific Ocean since the early 1980s. The specific ICBM that was launched was not stated.

Missile ranges

File:PRC Conventional Strike Ranges 2022.png|Chinese Conventional Strike Ranges as of 2022 File:China Nuclear Ballistic Missile Ranges.png|Chinese Nuclear Ballistic Missile Strike Ranges as of 2022

Ranks

Officers

Enlisted

Leadership

Commander:

• Xiang Shouzhi (July - August 1967)
• Yang Junsheng (September 1968 - May 1969)
• Zhang Yixiang (May 1969 - April 1975)
• Xiang Shouzhi (April 1975 - September 1977)
• Li Shuiqing (September 1977 - November 1982)
• He Jinheng (November 1982 - July 1985)
• Li Xuge (July 1985 - November 1992)
• Yang Guoliang (November 1992 - January 2003)
• Jing Zhiyuan (January 2003 - October 2012)
• Wei Fenghe (October 2012 - August 2017)
• Zhou Yaning (August 2017 - January 2022)
• Li Yuchao (January 2022 - July 2023)
• Wang Houbin (July 2023 - October 2025)

Political Commissars:

• Li Tianhuan (July 1967 - March 1968)
• Wu Lie (1968 -1970)
• Chen Fanong (1970 - 1975)
• Chen Heqiao (May 1975 - November 1982)
• Liu Lifeng (November 1982 - April 1990)
• Liu Anyuan (April 1990 - November 1992)
• Sui Yongju (November 1992 - November 1997)
• Sui Mingtai (November 1997 - December 2003)
• Peng Xiaofeng (December 2003 - December 2009)
• Zhang Haiyang (December 2009 - December 2014)
• Wang Jiasheng (December 2014 - July 2020)
• Xu Zhongbo (July 2020 - July 2023)
• Xu Xisheng (July 2023 - present)

Equipment

Firearms

The Special Operations Regiment has been seen using QBZ-95 rifles and QBU-88 sniper rifles.

The QBZ-03 has also been used by the PLARF.

Active missiles

As of at least 2024, China has the largest land-based missile arsenal in the world.

Retired missiles

• DF-3A, CSS-2 (IRBM) – In service from 1971 to 2014

Transporter erector launchers

• TA580/TAS5380
• TA5450/TAS5450
• HTF5680A1
• WS2300
• WS2400
• WS2500
• WS2600

Tractor trucks

• Hanyang HY4260
• Hanyang HY4330

Structure

The PLARF is directly subordinated to the CMC. and headquartered in Beijing. The PLARF comprises more than 120,000 personnel, and is organized into six operational bases and three support bases; these are corps leader or corps deputy grade units. The operational bases cover geographical areas, and their ordnance mix reflects their location and mission. They are similarly structured with six to eight missile brigrades, support regiments, and at least one hospital. Base equipment inspection regiments are responsible for storing nuclear warheads. Bases have peacetime administrative control of nuclear forces. In wartime, the CMC has direct control over nuclear forces. Control over conventional forces is unclear; in 2022, there was evidence of continuing integration with theater commands.

The PLARF has operated a separate command and control structure from the rest of the PLA since 1967. The goal of the system is to ensure tight control of nuclear warheads at the highest levels of government. This is done by the Central Military Commission having direct control of the PLARF, outside of the structure of military regions. The six operational Bases are independently deployed in the five Theaters throughout China. and each controls a number of brigades.

The Military Unit Cover Designators (MUCD) from the April 2017 system for PLARF units are 5-digit numbers starting with "96" with the remaining digits organization details. MCUD's starting with "961" or "965" are from the pre-2017 MUCD system.

Headquarters

PLARF headquarters has four administrative departments: Staff Department, Political Work Department, Equipment Department, and Logistics Department.

Wang Houbin became PLARF commander in July 2023, Xu Xisheng was the political commissar in 2022.

Base 61

(第六十一基地), MUCD Unit 96601 is an operational base covering eastern and some of southeastern China with headquarters in Huangshan, Anhui. It was created in 1965.

Base 61 includes a brigade for testing its large short-ranged conventional missile inventory and an unmanned aerial vehicle regiment for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance.

Base 62

(第六十二基地), MUCD Unit 96602 is an operational base covering most of southeastern China with headquarters in Kunming, Yunnan. It was created in 1966.

Base 63

(第六十三基地), MUCD Unit 96603 is an operational base covering southern inland China with headquarters in Huaihua, Hunan.

Base 63 includes a regiment responsible for fueling liquid-fuelled missiles.

Base 64

(第六十四基地), MUCD Unit 96604 is an operational base covering northwest and north-central China with headquarters in Lanzhou, Gansu.

Base 64 has an equipment inspection brigade instead of a regiment.

Base 65

(第六十五基地), MUCD Unit 96605 is an operational base covering eastern and northeastern China with headquarters in Shenyang, Liaoning. It was formerly Base 51.

Base 66

(第六十六基地), MUCD Unit 96606 is an operational base covering central China with headquarters in Luoyang, Henan. It was established in 1966.

Base 67

Special Operations Regiment (第六十七基地) is a support base headquartered in Baoji, Shaanxi, responsible for the storage, maintenance and distribution of China's nuclear weapons. Base 67 was created in 1958 as Unit 0674 in Haiyan County, Qinghai. It was transferred to the Commission for Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense in 1969 and moved to Shaanxi, and then to the Second Artillery Corps in 1980. It was known as Base 22 until 2017.

Base 67 includes the subterranean nuclear weapons storage complex in Taibai County in the Qin Mountains. Preparations to move the nuclear weapons storage facility to Taibai began in 1969. In 2010, relatively few warheads were maintained at operational base-level for extended durations. The distribution of warheads is reliant on the country's transportation network. The construction of the Baoji–Chengdu railway by the PLA in the 1960s may have been to support warhead distribution. A derailment inside a tunnel during the 2008 Sichuan earthquake shutdown the Baoji–Chengdu railway for 12 days. In another incident, a Second Artillery Corps crane was used to clear a multiple-vehicle collision caused by icy roads in the Qin Mountains.

The Missile Technical Service Brigade is the main unit overseeing the Taibai facility. Its main focus seems to be warhead storage and maintenance. It is complemented by the brigade-sized Unit 96038 which seems focused on inspection and testing of certain warhead components. Unit 96038 includes a security battalion with the 38-member "Sharp Blade" Special Operations Team (利刃特种大队) for site defense and the "Guardian Spirits of the Restricted Zone" Security Company. The "Sharp Blade" unit also performs nuclear missile escort, warhead security and offensive tasks.

Base 68

(第六十八基地) is an engineering support base responsible for constructing physical infrastructure headquartered in Luoyang, Henan.

Base 68 was created as the PLARF Engineering Base in 2012 from the Engineering Technical Zongdui (ETZ); ETZ was created in 1962 to handle installation of test platforms for nuclear weapon and satellite tests. It was combined with 308th Engineering Command in 2017 to create Base 68.

Base 68 contains six engineering brigades plus support regiments.

Base 69

(第六十九基地) is a training support base created in 2017 headquartered in Yinchuan. It has four Test and Training Districts and various independent test and training regiments.

The 1st Test and Training District provides training in desert environments, and provides measurement and control support for missile tests. The 2nd Test and Training District hosts a opposing force (OPFOR) regiment for PLARF training. The 3rd Test and Training District provides training in plateau operations, hosts the PLARF's electronic warfare OPFOR unit, and supports the Gobi Desert test range. The 4th Test and Training District provides cruise missile and rail transport training.

Operations in Saudi Arabia

The PLARF Golden Wheel Project (Chinese Wikipedia: 金轮工程) co-operates the DF-3 and DF-21 medium-range ballistic missiles in Saudi Arabia since the establishment of Royal Saudi Strategic Missile Force in 1984.

Notes

References

Citations

Sources

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