Pramana

Quality 0.50 · 6 views · Updated 2 months ago

Epistemology, proof, reliable means of knowledge in Indian philosophies

title: "Pramana" type: doc version: 1 created: 2026-02-28 author: "Wikipedia contributors" status: active scope: public tags: ["sources-of-knowledge", "concepts-in-epistemology", "hindu-philosophical-concepts", "buddhist-logic", "epistemology-literature"] description: "Epistemology, proof, reliable means of knowledge in Indian philosophies" topic_path: "philosophy" source: "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pramana" license: "CC BY-SA 4.0" wikipedia_page_id: 0 wikipedia_revision_id: 0

::summary Epistemology, proof, reliable means of knowledge in Indian philosophies ::

::callout[type=note] proof and epistemology in Indian philosophies ::

Pramana (; IAST: Pramāṇa) literally means "proof" and "means of knowledge". One of the core concepts in Indian epistemology, pramanas are one or more reliable and valid means by which human beings gain accurate, true knowledge.

While the number of pramanas varies widely from system to system, many ancient and medieval Indian texts identify six pramanas as correct means of accurate knowledge and attaining to the truth. Three of these are almost universally accepted: perception (), inference (), and "word" (śabda), meaning the testimony of past or present reliable experts. The other three pramanas are more contentious: comparison and analogy (); postulation or derivation from circumstances (); and non-perception, or proof from absence (). Each of these are further categorized in terms of conditionality, completeness, confidence, and possibility of error.

The various schools of Indian philosophies vary on how many of these six pramanas are epistemically reliable and valid means to knowledge. For example, the Carvaka school of the Śramaṇa tradition holds that only one (perception) is a reliable source of knowledge, and the Mimamsa and Advaita Vedanta schools of Hinduism hold that all six pramanas are useful and can be reliable means to knowledge.

  • Eliott Deutsche (2000), in Philosophy of Religion : Indian Philosophy Vol 4 (Editor: Roy Perrett), Routledge, , pages 245-248;
  • John A. Grimes, A Concise Dictionary of Indian Philosophy: Sanskrit Terms Defined in English, State University of New York Press, , page 238 The various schools of Indian philosophy have debated whether one of the six forms of pramana can be derived from another and the relative uniqueness of each. For example, Buddhism considers Buddha and other "valid persons", "valid scriptures" and "valid minds" as indisputable, but that such testimony is a form of perception and inference pramanas.

Etymology

literally means "proof," based on the word pramā. The Sanskrit root (), is a preposition meaning "outward" or "forth", and () means "measurement." means "correct notion, true knowledge, basis, foundation, understand." being a nominalization of the word, means that which is a "means of acquiring or certain, correct, true knowledge".

forms one part of a trio of concepts, which describe the ancient Indian view on how knowledge is gained. The other two concepts are , (, the subject, the knower) and (, the object, the knowable). They each influence the knowledge, by their own characteristic and the process of knowing.

In Buddhist literature, is referred to as . is also related to the Indian concept of yukti () which means active application of epistemology or what one already knows, innovation, clever expedients or connections, methodological or reasoning trick, joining together, application of contrivance, means, method, novelty or device to more efficiently achieve a purpose. yukti and are discussed together in some Indian texts, with yukti described as active process of gaining knowledge in contrast to passive process of gaining knowledge through observation/perception. The texts on pramana, particularly by Samkhya, Yoga, Mimamsa and Advaita Vedanta schools of Hinduism, often include in their scope what might be termed "theories of errors"; that is, philosophies regarding the reason for human error, how one may know if one is wrong, and—if so—how one can discover whether one's epistemic method or conclusion was flawed, as well what one ought then do in order to correct it.

Hinduism

Six ''pramanas''

Hinduism identifies six pramanas as correct means of accurate knowledge and to truths: Pratyakṣa (evidence/perception), Anumāna (inference), Upamāna (comparison and analogy), Arthāpatti (postulation, derivation from circumstances), Anupalabdhi (non-perception, negative/cognitive proof) and Śabda (word, testimony of past or present reliable experts).

In verse 1.2.1 of the Taittirīya Āraṇyaka (c. 9th–6th centuries BCE), "four means of attaining correct knowledge" are listed: smṛti ("scripture, tradition"), pratyakṣa ("perception"), aitihya ("expert testimony, historical tradition"), and anumāna ("inference").

In some texts such as by Vedvyasa, ten pramanas are discussed, Krtakoti discusses eight epistemically reliable means to correct knowledge. Six most widely recognized pramanas are:

''Pratyakṣa''

Pratyakṣa (प्रत्यक्ष) means perception. It is of two types: external and internal. External perception is arises from the interaction between the five senses and worldly objects, while internal perception refers to the awareness arising from the inner sense, the mind. According to Matt Stefan, the distinction is between direct perception (anubhava/anubhavaḥ) and remembered perception (smriti/smṛti).

The ancient and medieval Indian texts identify four requirements for correct perception:

  1. Indriyārthasannikarṣa/Indriyārthasannikarṣaḥ: direct experience by one's sensory organ(s) with object being studied.
  2. Avyapadeśya: non-verbal; correct perception is not through hearsay, where one's sensory organ relies on accepting or rejecting someone else's perception, with no intermediate agency involved.
  3. Avyabhicāra: consistency; correct perception does not change, nor is it the result of deception because one's sensory organ or means of observation is drifting, defective, or suspect.
  4. Vyavasāyātmika: definite; lacks bias, and inferential judgment; correct perception excludes doubt, either from failure to observe all the details, or from mixing inference with observation.

Some ancient scholars proposed "unusual perception" as a pramāṇa, describing it as internal perception, a view contested by other Indian scholars. These internal perceptions include pratibhā (intuition), sāmānyalakṣaṇapratyakṣa (induction from specifics to a universal), and jñānalakṣaṇapratyakṣa (perceiving prior states of a 'topic of study' by observing its present state). Some schools of Hinduism considered and refined rules of accepting uncertain knowledge from pratyakṣa pramana, distinguishing nirṇaya (definite judgment, conclusion) from anadhyavasāya (indefinite judgment).

''Anumāna''

Anumāna (अनुमान) means ‘inference’ in Sanskrit, though it often is used to mean ‘guess’ in modern Indian languages. In the context of classical philosophy, it is described as reaching a new conclusion and truth from one or more observations and previous truths by applying reason. Observing smoke and inferring fire is an example of Anumana. this is a valid and useful means to knowledge. The method of inference is explained by Indian texts as consisting of three parts: pratijna (hypothesis), hetu (a reason), and drshtanta (examples). The hypothesis must further be broken down into two parts, state the ancient Indian scholars: sadhya (that idea which needs to be proven or disproven) and paksha (the object on which the sadhya is predicated). The inference is conditionally true if sapaksha (positive examples as evidence) are present, and if vipaksha (negative examples as counter-evidence) are absent. For rigor, the Indian philosophies also state further epistemic steps. For example, they demand Vyapti—the requirement that the hetu (reason) must necessarily and separately account for the inference in "all" cases, in both sapaksha and vipaksha. A conditionally proven hypothesis is called a nigamana (conclusion).

''Upamāna''

Upamāna (उपमान) means comparison and analogy. Upamana, states Lochtefeld, The subject of comparison is formally called upameyam, the object of comparison is called upamanam, while the attribute(s) are identified as samanya. Thus, explains Monier Williams, if a boy says "her face is like the moon in charmingness", "her face" is upameyam, the moon is upamanam, and charmingness is samanya. The 7th-century text Bhaṭṭikāvya in verses 10.28 through 10.63 discusses many types of comparisons and analogies, identifying when this epistemic method is more useful and reliable, and when it is not. In various ancient and medieval texts of Hinduism, 32 types of Upamāna and their value in epistemology are debated.

''Arthāpatti''

Arthāpatti (अर्थापत्ति) means postulation, derivation from circumstances. As an example, if a person was left in a boat on a river earlier, and the time is now past the expected time of arrival, then the circumstances support the truth postulate that the person has arrived. Many Indian scholars considered this pramana as invalid or at best weak, because the boat may have gotten delayed or diverted. However, in cases such as deriving the time of a future sunrise or sunset, this method was asserted by the proponents to be reliable. Another common example for arthapatti in ancient Hindu texts is, that if "Devadatta is fat" and "Devadatta does not eat during the day", then the following must be true: "Devadatta eats in the night". This form of postulation and deriving from circumstances is, claim the Indian scholars, a means to discovery, proper insight and knowledge. The Hindu schools that accept this means of knowledge state that this method is a valid means to conditional knowledge and truths about a subject and object in original premises or different premises. The schools that do not accept this method, state that postulation, extrapolation and circumstantial implication is either derivable from other pramanas or flawed means to correct knowledge, instead one must rely on direct perception or proper inference.

''Anupalabdhi''

Anupalabdhi (अनुपलब्धि) means non-perception, negative/cognitive proof. In the two schools of Hinduism that consider Anupalabdhi as epistemically valuable, a valid conclusion is either sadrupa (positive) or asadrupa (negative) relation—both correct and valuable. Like other pramana, Indian scholars refined Anupalabdi to four types: non-perception of the cause, non-perception of the effect, non-perception of object, and non-perception of contradiction. Only two schools of Hinduism accepted and developed the concept "non-perception" as a pramana. The schools that endorsed Anupalabdi affirmed that it is valid and useful when the other five pramanas fail in one's pursuit of knowledge and truth.

Abhava (अभाव) means non-existence. Some scholars consider Anupalabdi to be the same as Abhava, Abhava-pramana has been discussed in ancient Hindu texts in the context of Padārtha (पदार्थ, referent of a term). A Padartha is defined as that which is simultaneously Astitva (existent), Jneyatva (knowable) and Abhidheyatva (nameable).

''Śabda''

Śabda (शब्द) means relying on word, testimony of past or present reliable experts, Hiriyanna explains Sabda-pramana as a concept which means reliable expert testimony. The schools of Hinduism which consider it epistemically valid suggest that a human being needs to know numerous facts, and with the limited time and energy available, he can learn only a fraction of those facts and truths directly. He must rely on others, his parent, family, friends, teachers, ancestors and kindred members of society to rapidly acquire and share knowledge and thereby enrich each other's lives. This means of gaining proper knowledge is either spoken or written, but through Sabda (words).

Acceptance per school

Different schools of Hindu philosophy accept one or more of these pramanas as valid epistemology.

Carvaka school

Carvaka school accepted only one valid source of knowledge—perception.

Vaisheshika school

Epistemologically, the Vaiśeṣika school considered the following as the only proper means of knowledge:

  1. Perception (Pratyakṣa)
  2. Inference (Anumāna)

Sankhya, Yoga, Vishishtadvaita Vedanta, and Dvaita Vedanta schools

According to the Sankhya, Yoga, and two sub-schools of Vedanta, the proper means of knowledge must rely on these three pramanas:

  1. Pratyakṣa — perception
  2. Anumāna — inference
  3. Śabda/Agama — testimony/word of reliable experts

These are enumerated in sutra I.7 of the Yoga Sutras. The mode of Pramana itself in sutra I.6 is distinguished among 5 classes of vritti/mental modification, the others including indiscrimination, verbal delusion, sleep, and memory.

Nyaya school

Main article: Nyaya

Nyaya literally means the science and study of pramanas. The Nyāya school accepts four means of obtaining knowledge (pramāṇa), viz., Perception (Pratyakṣa), Inference (Anumāna), Comparison (Upamāna), and Word (Śabda).

Prabhakara Mimamsa school

In the Mimamsa school of Hinduism, linked to Prabhakara, the following pramanas are considered as proper:

  1. Pratyakṣa (perception)
  2. Anumāṇa (inference)
  3. Śabda (word, testimony)
  4. Upamāṇa (comparison, analogy)
  5. Arthapatti (postulation, presumption)

Advaita Vedanta and Bhatta Mimamsa schools

In Advaita Vedānta, and Mimamsa school linked to Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, the following pramanas are accepted:

  1. Śabda (word, testimony)
  2. Pratyakṣa (perception)
  3. Anumāṇa (inference)
  4. Upamāṇa (comparison, analogy)
  5. Arthāpatti (postulation, presumption)
  6. Anupalabdhi, Abhava (non-perception, cognitive proof using non-existence) Nearly all Vedantins, except Neo-Vedantins for example, accept śabda pramāṇa as a more important pramāṇa than anumāna.

Buddhism

Main article: Buddhist logic

According to the Padmākara Translation Group, in a 2005 translation of Śāntarakṣita's The Adornment of the Middle Way: ::quote

Strictly speaking, pramana (tshad ma) means "valid cognition." In [Buddhist] practice, it refers to the tradition, principally associated with Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, of logic (rtags rigs) and epistemology (blo rigs).Śāntarakṣita (author); Mipham (commentator); Padmākara Translation Group (trans.): The Adornment of the Middle Way: Shantarakshita's Madhyamakalankara with commentary by Jamgön Mipham. (2005) Boston, Massachusetts, USA: Shambhala Publications, Inc. (alk. paper): p.390 ::

Buddhism accepts only two pramana (tshad ma) as valid means to knowledge: Pratyaksha (mngon sum tshad ma, perception) and Anumāṇa (rjes dpag tshad ma, inference). Means of cognition and knowledge, other than perception and inference, are considered invalid in Buddhism.

In Buddhism, the two most important scholars of pramāṇa are Dignāga and Dharmakīrti.

Sautrantrika

Dignāga and Dharmakīrti are usually categorized as expounding the view of the Sautrāntika tenets, though one can make a distinction between the "Sautrāntikas Following Scripture" () and the "Sautrāntikas Following Reason" () and both these masters are described as establishing the latter. Dignāga's main text on this topic is the Pramāṇa-samuccaya. Dignāga's Pramāṇa-samuccaya played a crucial role in shaping the discipline of epistemology (pramāṇaśāstra), blending it with logical discourse. Dharmakīrti, influenced by Dignāga, further developed these ideas in his Pramanavarttika.

These two rejected the complex Abhidharma-based description of how in the Vaibhāṣika school and the Sautrāntika Following Scripture approach connected an external world with mental objects, and instead posited that the mental domain never connects directly with the external world but instead only perceives an aspect based upon the sense organs and the sense consciousnesses. Further, the sense consciousnesses assume the form of the aspect (Sanskrit: Sākāravāda) of the external object and what is perceived is actually the sense consciousness which has taken on the form of the external object. By starting with aspects, a logical argument about the external world as discussed by the Hindu schools was possible. Otherwise their views would be so different as to be impossible to begin a debate. Then a logical discussion could follow.

This approach attempts to solve how the material world connects with the mental world, but not completely explaining it. When pushed on this point, Dharmakīrti then drops a presupposition of the Sautrāntrika position and shifts to a kind of Yogācāra position that extramental objects never really occur but arise from the habitual tendencies of mind. So he begins a debate with Hindu schools positing external objects then later to migrate the discussion to how that is logically untenable.

Note there are two differing interpretations of Dharmakīrti's approach later in Tibet, due to differing translations and interpretations. One is held by the Gelug school leaning to a moderate realism with some accommodation of universals and the other held by the other schools who held that Dharmakīrti was distinctly antirealist.

Apoha

A key feature of Dignāga's logic is in how he treats generalities versus specific objects of knowledge. The Nyāya Hindu school made assertions about the existence of general principles, and in refutation Dignāga asserted that generalities were mere mental features and not truly existent. To do this he introduced the idea of Apoha, that the way the mind recognizes is by comparing and negating known objects from the perception. In that way, the general idea or categories of objects has to do with differences from known objects, not from identification with universal truths. So one knows that a perceived chariot is a chariot not because it is in accord with a universal form of a chariot, but because it is perceived as different from things that are not chariots. This approach became an essential feature of Buddhist epistemology.

Madhyamaka

The contemporary of Dignāga but before Dharmakīrti, Bhāvaviveka, incorporated a logical approach when commenting upon Nāgārjuna. He also started with a Sautrāntika approach when discussing the way appearances appear, to debate with realists, but then took a Middle Way view of the ultimate nature of phenomenon. But he used logical assertions and arguments about the nature of that ultimate nature.

His incorporation of logic into the Middle Way system was later critiqued by Candrakīrti, who felt that the establishment of the ultimate way of abiding since it was beyond thought and concept was not the domain of logic. He used simple logical consequence arguments to refute the views of other tenet systems, but generally he thought a more developed use of logic and epistemology in describing the Middle Way was problematic. Bhāvaviveka's use of autonomous logical arguments was later described as the Svātantrika approach.

In Tibet

Modern Buddhist schools employ the 'three spheres' (Sanskrit: trimaṇḍala; Tibetan: 'khor gsum):

  1. subject
  2. object,
  3. action.

When Madhyamaka first migrated to Tibet, Śāntarakṣita established a view of Madhyamaka more consistent with Bhāvaviveka while further evolving logical assertions as a way of contemplating and developing one's viewpoint of the ultimate truth.

In the 14th century Je Tsongkhapa presented a new commentary and approach to Madhyamaka, which became the normative form in Tibet. In this variant, the Madhyamaka approach of Candrakīrti was elevated instead of Bhāvaviveka's yet Tsongkhapa rejected Candrakirti's disdain of logic and instead incorporated logic further.

The exact role of logic in Tibetan Buddhist practice and study may still be a topic of debate, but it is definitely established in the tradition. Ju Mipham remarked in his 19th-century commentary on Śāntarakṣita's Madhyamakālaṅkāra:

Notes

References

Sources

Bibliography

  • Śāntarakṣita (author); Mipham (commentator); Padmākara Translation Group (translators)(2005). The Adornment of the Middle Way: Shantarakshita's Madhyamakalankara with commentary by Jamgön Mipham. Boston, Massachusetts, US: Shambhala Publications, Inc. (alk. paper)

References

  1. [http://spokensanskrit.org/index.php?tran_input=pramANa&direct=se&script=hk&link=yes&mode=3 pramANa] Sanskrit-English Dictionary, Koeln University, Germany
  2. James Lochtefeld, "Pramana" in The Illustrated Encyclopedia of Hinduism, Vol. 2: N-Z, Rosen Publishing. {{ISBN. 0-8239-2287-1, pages 520-521
  3. 81-208-0779-0, pages 25-26
  4. DPS Bhawuk (2011), Spirituality and Indian Psychology (Editor: [[Anthony J. Marsella]]), Springer, {{ISBN. 978-1-4419-8109-7, page 172
  5. 978-0521438780, page 225
  6. "Pramana".
  7. P Bilimoria (1993), Pramāṇa epistemology: Some recent developments, in Asian philosophy - Volume 7 (Editor: G Floistad), Springer, {{ISBN. 978-94-010-5107-1, pages 137-154
  8. 978-0791430675, page 238
  9. [https://www.sanskrit-lexicon.uni-koeln.de/scans/MWScan/2014/web/webtc2/index.php प्रमा] Monier-Williams Sanskrit-English Dictionary, Koeln University, Germany
  10. John A. Grimes (1996), A Concise Dictionary of Indian Philosophy: Sanskrit Terms Defined in English, State University of New York Press, {{ISBN. 978-0791430675, page 237-238
  11. [http://spokensanskrit.de/index.php?tinput=pramAtR&direction=SE&script=HK&link=yes&beginning= pramAtR] Sanskrit-English Dictionary, Koeln University, Germany
  12. [http://spokensanskrit.de/index.php?tinput=prameya&direction=SE&script=HK&link=yes&beginning=0 prameya] Sanskrit-English Dictionary, Koeln University, Germany
  13. Tom J. F. Tillemans (2011), Buddhist Epistemology (pramāṇavāda), The Oxford Handbook of World Philosophy (Editors: William Edelglass and Jay L. Garfield), {{doi. 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195328998.003.0022
  14. [http://www.sanskrit-lexicon.uni-koeln.de/scans/MWScan/tamil/index.html yukti] Monier-Williams' Sanskrit-English Dictionary, Cologne Digital Sanskrit Lexicon, Germany
  15. R Narasimha (2012), Asia, Europe, and the Emergence of Modern Science: Knowledge Crossing Boundaries, Palgrave Macmillan, {{ISBN. 978-1137031723, pages 95-97
  16. R Narasimha (2012), Asia, Europe, and the Emergence of Modern Science: Knowledge Crossing Boundaries, Palgrave Macmillan, {{ISBN. 978-1137031723, pages 95-105
  17. CA Scherrer-Schaub (1981), ''Le term yukti: primiere etude'', Etudes Asiatiques, 35: 185-199
  18. EI Warrier (2012), Advaita Vedānta from 800 to 1200 (Editor: Karl Potter), Motilal Banarsidass, {{ISBN. 978-8120830615, pages 512-530, 684
  19. Gerald Larson and Ram Bhattacharya, The Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies (Editor:Karl Potter), Volume 4, Princeton University Press, {{ISBN. 978-0691073019, pages 361-362
  20. L Schmithausen (1965), Maṇḍana Miśra's Vibhrama-viveka, Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften. Phil.-hist. Klasse. Sitzungsberichte, Vol. 247; For excerpts in English: Allen Thrasher (1993), The Advaita Vedānta of Brahma-siddhi, {{ISBN. 978-8120809826, pages 20-38
  21. A. B. Keith (1925), [https://books.google.com/books?id=p9zCbRMQbyEC&dq=pratyaksa&pg=PA482 ''The Religion and Philosophy of the Veda and Upanishads''], Part II, p.482
  22. S. C. Vidyabhusana (1971). [https://books.google.com/books?id=0lG85RD9YZoC&dq=taittiriya+pratyaksa&pg=PA23 ''A History of Indian Logic: Ancient, Mediaeval, and Modern Schools''], p.23
  23. Andrew J. Nicholson (2013), ''[[Unifying Hinduism: Philosophy and Identity in Indian Intellectual History]]'', Columbia University Press, {{ISBN. 978-0231149877, pages 149-150
  24. Karl Potter and Sibajiban Bhattacharya (1994), Epistemology, in The Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, Volume 6, Princeton University Press, {{ISBN. 978-0691073842, pages 53-68
  25. Howard Coward et al, Epistemology, in Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, Volume 5, Motilal Banarsidass, {{ISBN. 81-208-0426-0, pages 51-62
  26. MM Kamal (1998), The Epistemology of the Carvaka Philosophy, Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies, 46(2): 13-16
  27. B Matilal (1992), Perception: An Essay in Indian Theories of Knowledge, Oxford University Press, {{ISBN. 978-0198239765
  28. Matt Stefan, [https://www.britannica.com/topic/pratyaksha pratyaksha], Encyclopedia Britannica.
  29. Karl Potter (1977), Meaning and Truth, in Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, Volume 2, Princeton University Press, Reprinted in 1995 by Motilal Banarsidass, {{ISBN. 81-208-0309-4, pages 160-168
  30. Karl Potter (1977), Meaning and Truth, in Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, Volume 2, Princeton University Press, Reprinted in 1995 by Motilal Banarsidass, {{ISBN. 81-208-0309-4, pages 168-169
  31. Karl Potter (1977), Meaning and Truth, in Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, Volume 2, Princeton University Press, Reprinted in 1995 by Motilal Banarsidass, {{ISBN. 81-208-0309-4, pages 170-172
  32. W Halbfass (1991), Tradition and Reflection, State University of New York Press, {{ISBN. 0-7914-0362-9, page 26-27
  33. James Lochtefeld, "Anumana" in The Illustrated Encyclopedia of Hinduism, Vol. 1: A-M, Rosen Publishing. {{ISBN. 0-8239-2287-1, page 46-47
  34. Karl Potter (2002), Presuppositions of India's Philosophies, Motilal Banarsidass, {{ISBN. 81-208-0779-0
  35. Monier Williams (1893), Indian Wisdom - Religious, Philosophical and Ethical Doctrines of the Hindus, Luzac & Co, London, page 61
  36. 0-8239-2287-1, page 721
  37. Monier Williams (1893), Indian Wisdom - Religious, Philosophical and Ethical Doctrines of the Hindus, Luzac & Co, London, pages 457-458
  38. James Lochtefeld, "Arthapatti" in The Illustrated Encyclopedia of Hinduism, Vol. 1: A-M, Rosen Publishing. {{ISBN. 0-8239-2287-1, page 55
  39. Stephen Phillips (1996), Classical Indian Metaphysics, Motilal Banarsidass, {{ISBN. 978-8120814899, pages 41-63
  40. DM Datta (1932), The Six Ways of Knowing: A Critical study of the Advaita theory of knowledge, University of Calcutta, Reprinted in 1992 as {{ISBN. 978-8120835269, pages 221-253
  41. Karl Potter. (1977). "Meaning and Truth". Princeton University Press; reprint by Motilal Banarsidass.
  42. Chris Bartley. (2013). "Padartha". Routledge.
  43. (1992). "abhava". Sahitya Akademy.
  44. M. Hiriyanna (2000), The Essentials of Indian Philosophy, Motilal Banarsidass, {{ISBN. 978-8120813304, page 43
  45. 978-94-010-7810-8, pages 1-30
  46. It held all remaining methods as outright invalid or prone to error and therefore invalid.Ramkrishna Bhattacharya (2010), What the Cārvākas Originally Meant?, Journal of Indian Philosophy, 38(6): 529-542
  47. Nicholson, Andrew J.. (2007-08-01). "Reconciling dualism and non-dualism: three arguments in Vijñānabhikṣu’s Bhedābheda Vedānta". Journal of Indian Philosophy.
  48. 978-0937938768, pages 19-20
  49. Lati Rinbochay and Elizabeth Napper (1981), Mind in Tibetan Buddhism, {{ISBN. 978-0937938027, page 115-119
  50. Śāntarakṣita & Ju Mipham (2005) p.1
  51. Śāntarakṣita & Ju Mipham (2005) pp. 32–39
  52. Arnold, Daniel Anderson. (2005). "Buddhists, brahmins, and belief: epistemology in South Asian philosophy of religion". Columbia University Press.
  53. Śāntarakṣita & Ju Mipham (2005) p.37
  54. Śāntarakṣita & Ju Mipham (2005) pp. 35–37
  55. Thub-bstan-chos-kyi-grags-pa, Chokyi Dragpa, Heidi I. Koppl, Chokyi Nyima Rinpoche (2004). ''Uniting Wisdom and Compassion: Illuminating the thirty-seven practices of a bodhisattva''. Wisdom Publications. {{ISBN
  56. Śāntarakṣita & Ju Mipham (2005) pp. 38–39

::callout[type=info title="Wikipedia Source"] This article was imported from Wikipedia and is available under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 License. Content has been adapted to SurfDoc format. Original contributors can be found on the article history page. ::

sources-of-knowledgeconcepts-in-epistemologyhindu-philosophical-conceptsbuddhist-logicepistemology-literature