Ground-Based Midcourse Defense

Quality 0.50 · 3 views · Updated 2 months ago

United States anti-ballistic missile system

title: "Ground-Based Midcourse Defense" type: doc version: 1 created: 2026-02-28 author: "Wikipedia contributors" status: active scope: public tags: ["missile-defense-agency", "anti-ballistic-missiles-of-the-united-states", "boeing", "raytheon-company-products", "lockheed-martin", "missile-defense"] description: "United States anti-ballistic missile system" topic_path: "geography/united-states" source: "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ground-Based_Midcourse_Defense" license: "CC BY-SA 4.0" wikipedia_page_id: 0 wikipedia_revision_id: 0

::summary United States anti-ballistic missile system ::

::figure[src="https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/e/e0/OBV_GBI_1.jpg" caption="A [[Ground-Based Interceptor]] loaded into a silo at [[Fort Greely]], Alaska in July 2004."] ::

Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD), previously National Missile Defense (NMD), is an anti-ballistic missile system implemented by the United States of America for defense against ballistic missiles, during the midcourse phase of ballistic trajectory flight. It is a major component of the American missile defense strategy to counter ballistic missiles, including intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) carrying nuclear, chemical, biological or conventional warheads.

As of 2018, the system is composed of two interceptor staging bases in the states of Alaska and California, with 40 staged in the former, 4 staged in the latter, for a total of 44 interceptors, as well as the component early warning and targeting sensors based on land, sea, and in orbit. As of 2019, a Missile Defense Review has requested 20 additional interceptors to be based in Fort Greely, Alaska, though their delivery has not materialized.

GMD is administered by the U.S. Missile Defense Agency (MDA), while operational control is provided by the U.S. Army, with support functions provided by the U.S. Air Force and U.S. Space Force.

Background

GMD after its renaming in 2002 remains a limited defense system, intended to protect the continental United States from limited launches of ballistic missiles. Examples given in the past have included countries such as North Korea.

GMD has undergone some controversy over its operational lifetime, such as with a study in 2000 by the Union of Concerned Scientists and the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology concluding that "[a]ny country capable of deploying a long-range missile would also be able to deploy countermeasures that would defeat the planned NMD system." Countermeasures studied in detail were bomblets containing biological or chemical agents, aluminized balloons to serve as decoys and to disguise warheads, and cooling warheads to reduce the kill vehicle's ability to detect them. Currently, the Union of Concerned Scientists maintains that GMD is "unproven, unaccountable, and unhelpful for reducing the nuclear threat."

More recently, questions have been asked about the Pentagon characterizing the January 28 test in 2016 as a success, when LA Times reported that the EKV suffered a fault in its reaction control system thrusters, which resulted in "a distance 20 times greater than what was expected" according to an anonymous Pentagon scientist.

Under the Missile Defense Agency, GMD has conducted multiple test exercises, with mixed results. Early testing revealed deficiencies in the Ground Based Interceptor missile, as well as the Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle. However, with time, success rates increased, marred by the occasional technical failure such as in 2010's FTG-06 (Flight Test Ground-Based Interceptor) where the Sea-based X Band Radar failed to perform as expected, and the subsequent FTG-06a where despite all elements performing correctly, intercept failed to occur.

Description

::figure[src="https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/8/81/Exoatmospheric_Kill_Vehicle_prototype.jpg" caption="Prototype of the [[Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle"] ::

GMD is tied into existing United States missile warning infrastructure, as well as purpose-built radar sites. It also encompasses 44 ground-based missile interceptors housed at two military bases.

Boeing Defense, Space & Security is the prime contractor of the program, tasked to oversee and integrate systems from other major defense sub-contractors, such as Computer Sciences Corporation and Raytheon.

The key sub-systems of the GMD system are:

Interceptor sites are at Fort Greely, Alaska and Vandenberg Space Force Base, California. A third site was planned for a proposed US missile defense complex in Poland, but was canceled in September 2009.

In late 2013, there were plans for a proposed Eastern United States site to house a battery of these missiles. Four sites were shortlisted in January 2014 for an East Coast site - SERE Remote Training Site in Maine (Rangeley), Fort Drum in New York, Camp James A. Garfield in Ohio, and Fort Custer Training Center in Michigan. Camp Ethan Allen Training Site in Vermont was dropped from consideration in late 2013.

In January 2014 the Pentagon announced they were starting a two-year environmental impact study under the 2013 defense authorization bill, which required two missile-defense sites to be identified on the East Coast. The CBO has estimated that a site would cost US$3.5bn.

In June 2019, Fort Drum in New York was chosen as the location for the potential East Coast missile defense site.

In December 2008, the U.S. Missile Defense Agency awarded Boeing a $397.9 million contract to continue development of the program.

In March 2013, the Obama administration announced plans to add 14 interceptors to the current 26 at Fort Greely in response to North Korean threats. The deployment of a second TPY-2 radar to Japan was announced at the same time. While President Obama said that the additional deployment was a hedge against unexpected capabilities, Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman Hong Lei complained that the additional defenses would affect the global strategic balance and strategic trust.

On 30 April 2014, the Government Accountability Office issued a report stating that the system may not be operational any time soon because "its development was flawed". It said the GBI missile was at that point "capable of intercepting a simple threat in a limited way". On 12 August 2015, Lt. General David L. Mann (commanding general USASMDC/ARSTRAT) characterized GMD as the nation's only ground-based defense against limited ICBM attacks.

Issues with the EKV prompted the MDA to work with Raytheon, Boeing, and Lockheed Martin on a new Redesigned Kill Vehicle (RKV), scheduled to debut in 2025. In 2019, the government issued a stop work order for the RKV after recent test results indicated that the current RKV plan is not viable. The government "initiated an analysis of alternative courses of action"; on 21 August the MDA cancelled the $5.8 billion contract for the RKV.Loren Thompson (8 Oct 2019) Inside The U.S. Missile Defense Agency's Secret Next Generation Interceptor

  • 50 threat scenarios have been defined (Classified)
  • The GBIs will be Hit-to-kill
  • Each GBI will have multiple warheads (multiple kill vehicles)
  • The GBIs will fit in existing silos
  • The GBIs are expected by 2026
  • The interim GBI solution until then is to be determined The current GMD programs continue per plan, with up to 64 GBIs (meaning an additional 20) in the missile fields for 2019.

Program costs

::figure[src="https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/6/6f/X_band_radar_platform_entering_Pearl_on_Heavy_lift_Marlin.jpg" caption="[[Sea-based X-band Radar]] platform arriving in Pearl Harbor in January 2006."] ::

Expenditures on the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense program were estimated to be US$30.7 billion by 2007. In 2013, it was estimated that the program would cost $40.926 billion from inception through fiscal year 2017; in 2013–17 spending was to total $4.46 billion, an average of $892 million per year.

Flight tests

:BV: Booster Verification Test :CMCM: Critical Measurements and Countermeasures :CTV: Control Test Vehicle :FTG: Flight Test Ground-Based Interceptor :FTX: Flight Test Other :IFT: Integrated Flight Test

Intercept tests

After the FTG-12 test on 11 December 2023, 12 of the 21 (57%) hit-to-kill intercept tests have succeeded. No flight intercept tests from 2010 to 2013 were successful. In response the Pentagon asked for a budget increase and another test for the fielded program. The successful intercept FTG-15 was accomplished by an operational team of the 100th Missile Defense Brigade using their standard operating procedures (round-the-clock 24/7).

::data[format=table]

NamedateResultDescription
IFT-3This was an element test of the EKV that relied on a surrogate booster vehicle. Because the Inertial Measurement Unit malfunctioned, the EKV used a backup acquisition mode to acquire the target.
IFT-4This was the first end-to-end system test, again relying on a surrogate booster vehicle. The test was designed to target a mock warhead, transmitting its location by GPS, and ignore a single large decoy balloon. The failure to intercept was traced to an obstructed cooling line on the EKV that disrupted the IR sensors' ability to cool down to their operating temperatures in time, leaving the EKV unable to detect its target.
IFT-5This was the second end-to-end system test. The test was designed to target a mock warhead, transmitting its location by C-band, and ignore a single large decoy balloon. The failure to intercept occurred because the EKV did not separate from the boost vehicle due to an apparent failure of the 1553 data bus in the booster.
IFT-6This test repeated IFT-5. The prototype X-Band radar falsely reported a missed target but was confirmed by a satellite, jet, and ground stations.
IFT-7This test repeated IFT-6 except that the target booster used Orbital's Target Launch Vehicle instead of Lockheed Martin's Multi-Service Launch System.
IFT-8The test was designed to target a mock warhead, transmitting its location by C-band, and ignore both a large decoy balloon and two small decoy balloons.
IFT-9Twice delayed from August, this was the first test to use the Aegis SPY-1 radar, although it was not used to achieve the intercept. After the classification of decoys since May 2002, no information is known on their details.
IFT-10The failure to intercept occurred because the EKV did not separate from the boost vehicle because a pin broke that should have activated a laser to release the boost vehicle's restraining units.
IFT-13CDelayed several times from December 2003 due to bad circuitry, this test was designed to use the Orbital Sciences booster from Kwajalein to hit a target from Kodiak, Alaska. The target flew as planned but the booster failed to leave the ground. The failure was traced to a software problem on the 1553 communications data bus, which may be incapable of processing messages at a rate that is fast enough for the GMD system to work effectively.
IFT-14This test repeated IFT-13C, with a booster from Kwajalein designed to hit a target from Kodiak, Alaska. Again, the target flew as planned but the booster failed to leave the ground. The failure was traced to the arms that hold the interceptor up in the silo. When they failed to fully retract, the launch was automatically aborted.
FTG-02This test involved the first ground-based interceptor launched from Vandenberg Air Force Base to intercept a "threat-representative" target from Kodiak, Alaska. This was the first time that operational radar was used to capture targeting information. Not officially an intercept test, this was originally designed to collect data on the phenomenology of the intercept and act as a radar certification test. No decoys were used.
FTG-03With the same setup as FTG-02, the test target flew off-course and an intercept did not occur.
FTG-03AThis test was scheduled in response to the failure of FTG-03, this time with a successful intercept.
FTG-05This test launched a threat-representative mock warhead from Kodiak Launch Complex, Alaska followed by a Ground-Based Interceptor from Vandenberg AFB. All components performed as designed.
FTG-06This test was to be the first to assess both a CE-II EKV and a complex target scene and the first test to use a newly developed FTF LV-2 target. While the target missile and interceptor launched and performed nominally, the Sea Based X-Band Radar did not perform as expected, and an investigation will explain the failure to intercept.
FTG-06aThis test was similar to FTG-06, over a distance of 4,200 miles. While the Sea Based X-Band radar and all sensors performed as planned, the test was unable to achieve the planned intercept of a ballistic missile target.
FTG-07url=https://www.mda.mil/global/documents/pdf/ps_syring_050913_SASC.PDF
FTG-06burl=http://www.dote.osd.mil/pub/reports/FY2012/pdf/bmds/2012gmd.pdf
FTG-15The test involved the new CE-II Block-I version of the EKV, which executed a direct collision with the ICBM target.
FTG-1125 Mar 2019url=https://www.army.mil/article/219788/national_guard_soldiers_at_forefront_of_most_significant_test_in_missile_defense_history
FTG-1211 Dec 2023url=https://www.mda.mil/news/23news0006.htmltitle=Homeland Missile Defense System Conducts Successful Intercept Of Target
::

Non-intercept tests

::data[format=table]

NamedateResultDescription
IFT-1AThis test allowed the program to assess the Boeing EKV seeker's ability to collect target phenomenological data, and evaluate target modeling and discrimination algorithms for a cluster of 10 objects.
IFT-2This test allowed the program to assess the Raytheon EKV seeker's ability to collect target phenomenological data, and evaluate target modeling and discrimination algorithms for a cluster of 10 objects. As a result, Raytheon was selected over Boeing and was awarded the EKV contract.
BV-1This was a ground test to certify the procedures that lead to an actual flight test, including all ground and safety checks as well as launch and safety steps. The missile was not launched.
BV-2This was a flight test of three-stage Boeing Booster Vehicle with a mass-simulated kill vehicle payload. An anomaly occurred in the first-stage vehicle roll control, but the second- and third-stage motors performed normally.
BV-3This flight test resulted in failure when the Boeing Booster Vehicle steered off course 30 seconds after launch and was then ordered to self-destruct off the coast of California.
BV-6This was a flight test of the three-stage Orbital Sciences Booster Vehicle with a mass-simulated kill vehicle payload. The launch from Vandenberg Air Force Base proceeded normally over the Pacific Ocean.
BV-5This flight test of the Lockheed Martin Booster Vehicle with a mass-simulated kill vehicle payload resulted in failure due to an apparent power drop that prevented the mock EKV from separating from the booster. The flight was delayed by the third-stage rocket motor's circuit boards.
IFT-13BThis was a system-level test of the Orbital Sciences booster carrying a simulated EKV from Kwajalein Atoll against a simulated target from Vandenberg AFB in California.
Medium-range air-launch targetThis test featured a C-17 dropping a medium-range target from its rear, 800 mi northwest of the Pacific Missile Range Facility in Hawaii.
CMCM-1A/FT 04-2AThis test was the first of two medium-range target vehicles.
CMCM-1B/FT 04-2BThis test was the second of two medium-range target vehicles.
FT 04-5/FTG 04-5This test was an apparent variant of IFT-19 and featured an air-launched long-range target tracked by Cobra Dane radar.
FT-1Originally designed as IFT-13A, this test featured an interceptor missile from the Ronald Reagan test site in the Marshall Islands to hit a target from Kodiak, Alaska. The operationally configured warhead and its booster left the ground successfully.
FTX-01/FT 04-1Originally designed as IFT-16, then changed to a radar characterization flight test as IFT-16A, then FT 04-1, then FTX-01. This test incorporated radar and targets testing.
CMCM-2B/FTC-02BThis test was a radar certification flight and featured a missile system powered by a two-stage SR-19 rocket flown from the Kauai Test Facility in the Pacific Missile Range Facility. The payload included complex countermeasures, a mock reentry vehicle, and on-board sensor package.
CMCM-2A/FTC-02AThis test repeated FTC-02B to test its radars in the Pacific Missile Range Facility in Hawaii against a target missile that carried countermeasures, a mock warhead, and an on-board sensor package.
FTX-02This test of the Sea-Based X-Band Radar revealed "anomalous behavior", and demonstrated a need for software modifications to improve performance.
FTX-03This test demonstrated the integration of missile defense sensors to support an interceptor engagement. This revealed the success of the Sea-Based X-Band Radar to be used in future missions.
BVT-01A two-stage Ground-Based Interceptor successfully launched from Vandenberg Air Force Base, and after separating from the second-stage booster, the exoatmospheric kill vehicle executed a variety of maneuvers to collect data to further prove its performance in space. All components performed as designed.
GM CTV-01url=https://www.mda.mil/news/13news0001.html
GM CTV-02A long-range ground-based interceptor was launched from Vandenberg Air Force Base to evaluate performance of alternate divert thrusters for the system's Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle. The test had planned for the interceptor to fly within a narrow "miss distance" of its target to test the new thrusters' effectiveness. The U.S. military initially stated the test had been a success.
::

Canceled tests

Throughout the program's history, multiple test flights have been canceled, including BV-4, IFT-11, −12, −13, −13A, −15, FTC-03, and, most recently, FTG-04.

Estimated effectiveness

The system has a "single shot probability of kill" of its interceptors calculated at 56%, with the claimed total probability of intercepting a single target, if four interceptors are launched, at 97%. Each interceptor costs approximately $75 million.

The claim of "97% kill probability" has been dismissed by some experts as a flawed application of basic statistical methods. Said James M. Acton, co-director of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, "It assumes that the failure modes of the interceptors are independent of one another. But, in practice, if one interceptor fails because of a design flaw, say, it's much more likely that others will do so too for the same reason."

References

References

  1. "MDA - The Ballistic Missile Defense System".
  2. "There is no guaranteed defence against ballistic missiles—yet". The Economist.
  3. "Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) System".
  4. (17 January 2019). "President Trump's Plans to Boost Missile Defense Could Spark Arms Race".
  5. "Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) System".
  6. Vergun, David. (April 19, 2023). "Official Discusses Steps to Deter, Defeat Missile Threats".
  7. Union of Concerned Scientists/MIT Security Studies Program. [http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/nwgs/cm_all.pdf ''Countermeasures: A Technical Evaluation of the Operational Effectiveness of the Planned U.S. National Missile Defense System(Executive Summary and full text)''] {{Webarchive. link. (23 July 2014 (PDF). UCS-MIT Study, A.M. Sessler (Chair of the Study Group), J.M. Cornwall, R. Dietz, S.A. Fetter, S. Frankel, R.L. Garwin, K. Gottfried, L. Gronlund, G.N. Lewis, T.A. Postol, and D.C. Wright, April 2000.)
  8. "US Missile Defense {{!}} Union of Concerned Scientists".
  9. Willman, David. (2016-07-06). "A test of America's homeland missile defense system found a problem. Why did the Pentagon call it a success?".
  10. Bradner, Tim. (5 June 2009). "Begich, Gates visit Alaska missile defense base". [[Alaska Journal of Commerce]].
  11. (30 October 2009). "Northrop Grumman Contribution to Support Missile Defense Workforce in Alaska". reuters.com.
  12. (31 August 2008). "Commanding Alaska's Guard w/ 24/7 missile defense".
  13. "Missile Defense Agency (MDA) Exhibit R-2 RDT&E Budget Item Justification". [[Defense Technical Information Center]].
  14. Shalal-Esa, Andrea. (12 September 2013). "Maine among candidates named for possible East Coast missile defense sites". [[Bangor Daily News]].
  15. Shalal-Esa, Andrea. (31 January 2014). "Pentagon to further study four possible East Coast missile defense sites". [[Reuters]].
  16. Atkinson, Scott. (26 June 2019). "Fort Drum picked as site for east coast missile defense". [[WWNY]].
  17. (31 December 2008). "Boeing Wins Missile Deal". [[The Washington Post]].
  18. "US to beef up missile defense against NKorea.".
  19. Eshel, Tamir. (16 March 2013). "Alaska's Ground Based Interceptors to Pivot US Defenses Against North Korea". Defense Update.
  20. Mullen, Jethro. (18 March 2013). "China: U.S. risks antagonizing North Korea".
  21. (12 August 2015). "Mann addresses missile defense future during symposium".
  22. Wichner, David. (26 March 2019). "ICBM target downed in key test of missile defense, Raytheon Warhead". [[Arizona Daily Star]].
  23. Capaccio, Anthony. (6 June 2019). "As North Korea Threat Grows, U.S. Anti-Missile Warhead Stumbles".
  24. Insinna, Valerie. (21 August 2019). "Pentagon Cancels Multi-Billion $ Boeing Missile Defense Program".
  25. Judson, Jen. (23 July 2020). "Cost tripled for missile defense warhead, despite prior warnings, GAO finds".
  26. link. (3 November 2008 . United States House of Representatives, Committee on Oversight And Government Reform, June 2007.)
  27. (26 March 2013). "GAO-13-294SP, DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs". US Government Accountability Office.
  28. Lehner, Rick. (20 December 2008). "Missile Defense Agency Successfully Completes Ground Test for Data Collection to Improve Modeling and Simulation".
  29. (11 February 2014). "The Defense That Does not Defend: More problems for national missile defense". Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation.
  30. (14 February 2014). "2015 MDA Request Ignite Old Debate On the Cost of Success". Penton.
  31. (18 December 2017). "In Their Words: Missile defense crew recounts intercontinental ballistic missile target flight test".
  32. (18 June 2007). "Missile Defense Integrated Test Flights". Center for Defense Information.
  33. (8 July 2013). "Ballistic Missile Defense Intercept Flight Test Record". Missile Defense Agency.
  34. (1 September 2006). "Missile Defense Exercise and Flight Test Successfully Completed". [[Missile Defense Agency]].
  35. (5 December 2008). "Missile Defense Flight Test Results in Successful Intercept". [[Missile Defense Agency]].
  36. (25 February 2009). "Defense Acquisitions: Charting a Course for Improved Missile Defense Testing". [[Government Accountability Office]].
  37. (31 January 2010). "Missile Defense Test Conducted". Missile Defense Agency.
  38. (10 December 2010). "Missile Defense Test Conducted". Lompoc Record.
  39. (13 December 2010). "Draft Environmental Assessment for Maintenance and Repair of the Sea-Based X-Band Radar Vessel Available for Public Comment". [[Missile Defense Agency]].
  40. (5 July 2013). "Missile Defense Test Conducted". [[U.S. Department of Defense]].
  41. (5 July 2013). "Missile Defense Test Conducted".
  42. "Unclassified Statement of Vice Admiral James D. Syring Director, Missile Defense Agency". United States Senate via MDA.mil.
  43. (22 June 2014). "U.S. missile defense system destroys target in key test". [[Reuters]].
  44. (2012). "Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD)". U.S. Office of the Director, Operational Test & Evaluation.
  45. (30 May 2017). "US successfully intercepts ICBM in historic test".
  46. (2 February 2017). "Could FTG-15 Delays Prevent the Deployment of 44 GBIs by the End of 2017?".
  47. "With eyes on North Korea, U.S. successfully destroys mock ICBM over Pacific".
  48. Judson, Jen. (8 August 2017). "Missile takedown: Historic ICBM intercept test sends strong message to North Korea".
  49. Burns, Robert. (25 March 2019). "Pentagon: missile defense test succeeds in shootdown".
  50. (5 April 2019). "National Guard Soldiers at forefront of most significant test in missile defense history". United States Army.
  51. Zargham, Mohammad. (25 March 2019). "U.S. military says it conducts successful missile defense test". [[Reuters]].
  52. Capaccio, Anthony. (24 March 2019). "Trickiest U.S. Missile Defense Test Is Finally Ready to Launch". Bloomberg.
  53. (11 December 2023). "Homeland Missile Defense System Conducts Successful Intercept Of Target". Missile Defense Agency.
  54. [https://www.defensenews.com/land/2023/12/11/homeland-defense-interceptor-defeats-ballistic-missile-in-test/ Homeland defense interceptor defeats ballistic missile in test], Jen Judson, [[Defense News]], 2023-12-12
  55. (5 May 2005). "Missile Defense BV Test Flights". Center for Defense Information.
  56. "Boeing Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI)".
  57. (23 August 2005). "Orbital Successfully Launches Second Target Rocket for U.S. Missile Defense Agency's CMCM-1 Program; Two Launches in Two Weeks Conducted at Hawaii's Pacific Missile Site". Business Wire.
  58. (18 July 2008). "U.S. missile defense sensor test called successful".
  59. (6 June 2010). "Modified Ground-Based Interceptor Completes Successful Flight Test". [[Missile Defense Agency]].
  60. (28 January 2016). "Ground-based Midcourse Defense System Conducts Successful Flight Test". Missile Defense Agency.
  61. (6 July 2016). "A test of America's homeland missile defense system found a problem. Why did the Pentagon call it a success?". [[Los Angeles Times]].
  62. (16 June 2008). "GMD Test Cancelled by MDA". Center for Defense Information.
  63. Samson, Victoria. (16 June 2008). "GMD Test Cancelled by MDA".
  64. "Fact Check: Trump's claim that a U.S. interceptor can knock out ICBMs '97 percent of the time'". Washington Post.

::callout[type=info title="Wikipedia Source"] This article was imported from Wikipedia and is available under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 License. Content has been adapted to SurfDoc format. Original contributors can be found on the article history page. ::

missile-defense-agencyanti-ballistic-missiles-of-the-united-statesboeingraytheon-company-productslockheed-martinmissile-defense